February 19th, 1945. The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 7 in the morning. The cable from London arrived before Marshall’s coffee. He read it standing at his desk in his overcoat. He had come in early. He always came in early. The ward did not observe the distinction between morning and not yet morning, and neither did he.
The cable was from the British embassy routed through the foreign office marked diplomatic priority. It was six paragraphs. The first four were about the Rin crossing timeline, Montgomery’s preparations, the coordination with American forces, the operational picture as the British government understood it. The fifth paragraph was about Eisenhower.
The sixth paragraph was about command authority on the Western Front. Marshall read the fifth and sixth paragraphs three times. Then he set the cable on his desk and looked at it. He had been managing the diplomatic dimension of the Anglo-American alliance since 1942. He had managed it through North Africa and Sicily and Normandy and Market Garden and the Bulge and the press conference and the Telegram and everything between and behind those events.
He had never received a cable like this one, not in its content, in its tone. The fifth paragraph suggested that Eisenhower’s management of the final phase of the campaign was producing strategic outcomes that were not optimal for the Western Alliance. It used specific language about the broad front and the northern axis and the relationship between operational decisions and post-war positioning.
The sixth paragraph suggested that the combined chiefs of staff might wish to reconsider the command arrangements for the final phase of the European campaign. It did not say remove Eisenhower. It did not need to. Marshall put the cable in his briefcase. He called his aid. He said, “Book me on the next available flight to London.
” His aid said, “Sir, your schedule.” Marshall said, “Book the flight.” He had been to London 3 weeks earlier about Montgomery’s press conference. He was going back because 3 weeks later the problem had not resolved. It had escalated. The press conference correction had been issued. The telegram about the cowardice comment had produced an acknowledgement.
The meeting with Churchill about the command channel had produced commitments. 3 weeks of managed outcomes and then the cable. Marshall understood, reading it a second time on the flight across the Atlantic, that what he had been managing were symptoms. The press conference was a symptom. The cowardice comment was a symptom.
The Churchill Channel request was a symptom. The underlying condition was something else. The underlying condition was Britain’s diminishing influence over the final shape of the war. Churchill understood with the clarity of a man who had led a nation through 5 years of survival that the war’s final months would determine the post-war settlement.
That where armies stopped was where borders would be drawn. That which governments received Allied recognition was which governments would survive. that the decisions being made in February and March 1945 were not operational decisions about crossing rivers and taking cities. They were political decisions about what Europe would look like in 1950.
And the man making those decisions was Eisenhower, an American general implementing American strategic preferences as endorsed by the American government. Britain’s strategic preferences, the northern thrust, the drive toward Berlin, the positioning of Allied forces to limit Soviet expansion were not being ignored.
They were being heard, considered, and overruled systematically. The cable was not about the Ry crossing. The cable was about whether Britain still had a voice in how the war ended. Marshall understood this on the flight. He understood it with the precision of a man who had spent 3 years managing the gap between American power and British influence.
The gap had widened in 3 weeks. He needed to close it without losing anything that mattered. Marshall arrived in London on February 21st. He went to the foreign office first, not to the war office, not to Downing Street, the Foreign Office. He met with the permanent under secretary, a career diplomat named Alexander Kadagen, who had been managing British foreign policy since the 1930s and who understood the relationship between military operations and political outcomes better than most military men.
Marshall sat across from Kadagen in a room that smelled of documents and history and said, “Tell me what the cable was actually about.” Kadagan said, “I would have thought it was clear.” Marshall said, “The surface was clear. Tell me what’s underneath.” Kadagan looked at him for a moment. He said, “Britain is watching the final phase of the war being conducted according to American strategic preferences and producing outcomes that serve American post-war interests more than British ones.
” He said, “The broad front, the refusal to drive for Berlin, the accommodation of Soviet positions, these are decisions that have British consequences that the American side of the decision does not fully account for.” Marshall said, “We have accounted for them.” Kadagen said, “You have heard them.
Accounting would imply adjustment.” Marshall said, “The adjustments that were available within the military framework have been made. The decisions that could not be made within the military framework were referred to the governments.” Kadagen said, “And the governments decided in the American interest.” Marshall said, “The governments decided in the allied interest as the president assessed it.
” Kadagen said, “And the prime minister’s assessment differed.” Yes. Kadagan said and continues to differ. Yes. Kadogan said, “Then you understand why the cable was sent.” “I understand why it was sent. I’m here to discuss whether sending it was the right method for addressing the underlying concern.” Kadogan said, “What method would you prefer?” Marshall said, “One that doesn’t require me to fly to London every 3 weeks.
” Marshall met with Brooke that afternoon. Brookke had been the professional bridge between British military authority and American command since 1942. He had managed more difficult conversations than most men encountered in a career and had managed them with a precision that Marshall respected even when they disagreed.
They disagreed about many things. They had disagreed about the Mediterranean. They had disagreed about the northern thrust. They disagreed currently about Berlin. They had never stopped being honest with each other. Marshall said the cable went to the wrong address. Brooke said it went to the American embassy. That’s the right address for diplomatic cables.
Marshall said it should have come to me through military channels before it went to the embassy. Brookke said the prime minister made a political decision through political channels. Marshall said the prime minister made a political decision about a military command structure. That is a military question that should travel through military channels.
He said, “If you had sent me a cable raising concerns about command arrangements, I would have responded through military channels. We would have had a conversation. The conversation might not have produced what you wanted, but it would not have produced what that cable produced in Washington.” Brook said, “What did it produce?” Marshall said, “30 minutes with the president.
” Brookke said nothing. Marshall said, “The president read the cable before I did. His reaction was not favorable. He is now aware that the British government is raising formal questions about the command arrangements on the Western Front. That awareness will inform every communication between our governments for the rest of this war.
” Brookke said the concerns are legitimate. Marshall said the concerns are legitimate. The method was not. He said, “Allan, I need to ask you something directly.” Brookke said, “Ask.” Marshall said, “Is the goal of the cable to change the command arrangements on the Western Front, or is it to register a formal British position on the conduct of the final phase of the campaign?” Brooke was quiet for a moment.
He said, “Both.” Marshall said, “You cannot achieve both simultaneously. If it is about changing the arrangements, it requires a private military conversation that produces a specific outcome. If it is about registering a position, it is already accomplished. The position is registered. It is registered in Washington at the presidential level.
You will not get more registration by sending more cables. He said what you will get is a hardening of the American position in proportion to the pressure applied. Brookke said that is a very direct statement. Marshall said the situation requires it. Churchill received Marshall at 4 in the afternoon. The meeting was not a downing street.
Churchill had suggested his country residence a checkers. Marshall had accepted the distance from London created the specific privacy that both men understood the conversation required. Churchill opened with the strategic argument. He made it fully the northern thrust Berlin the Soviet advance the post-war implications of where Allied forces stopped.
He made it with the conviction of a man who had been making the same argument for 18 months and believed it more deeply each time he made it. Marshall listened. He had heard the argument before. He had heard it in August 1944 and September and October and November. He had heard it at Yaltta in the margins of conversations that were officially about other things.
He had heard it through Brooke and through the embassy and through the cable that had arrived on his desk 3 days ago. He let Churchill finish. Then he said, “Prime Minister, I want to say something that I have not said directly before.” Churchill said, “Say it.” Marshall said, “I believe you are right about the post-war implications.
I believe the broad front produces an outcome in Eastern Europe that a concentrated northern thrust might have avoided or reduced. I believe Berlin matters in ways that go beyond its military significance. I believe the Soviet position in 1950 will be stronger than it needs to be, partly because of decisions that were made on the Western Front in 1944 and 1945.
Churchill looked at him with the expression of a man who has been arguing a point for 18 months and has just heard the other side concede it. He said, “Then Marshall” said, “Because I cannot ask American soldiers to die for the postwar position of the British Empire.” He said it quietly without heat, without accusation. Churchill said nothing.
Marshall said that is the honest answer. The broadfront strategy produces the best outcome for the fewest American casualties in the minimum time. The northern thrust produces a better postwar position at a higher casualty cost and the longer timeline. The American government has authorized the broad front.
The American government has not authorized committing American lives to British post-war positioning. He said, “You know this. You have known it since Yaltta.” Churchill said, “I had hoped.” Marshall said, “I know what you hoped. I know what Yalta cost you to accept. I know what the Broadfront costs you every week that it continues.
” He said, “And I cannot change it, not because I don’t understand the stakes, because the authorization does not exist.” He said, “What I can change is the method by which Britain’s concerns are communicated, and I need to change it.” Churchill said, “What do you need from me?” Marshall said, “No more cables to the embassy about command arrangements.
” Churchill said, “And in return, Marshall said, a conversation, a real one, about what the final phase of this campaign produces and what can be done within the military framework that has been authorized.” He said, “There are decisions still to be made where forces stop east of the Rine, which cities are taken by whom, the coordination with Soviet forces.
Within the decisions that have been made, there is still room for decisions that account for what concerns you.” Churchill said, “Berlin.” Marshall said, “Berlin is decided. I cannot give you Berlin.” Churchill said, “Not even.” Marshall said, “It is decided. The occupation zone is agreed. Committing American forces to take a city that goes to the Soviet zone under agreements already signed is not a decision I can recommend.
” He said, “But there are other cities, other positions, other decisions within the authorized framework where British concerns can inform the outcome.” He said, “That is the conversation available.” Churchill said, “It is a smaller conversation than the one I need.” Marshall said, “Yes.” He said, “It is the conversation that exists.” Churchill looked at him.
He said, “You are a frustrating man, General.” Marshall said, “I am an honest one.” Churchill said, “In this case, those are the same thing.” He refilled his glass. He held the bottle toward Marshall. For the second time, Marshall accepted. Churchill said, “No more cables to the embassy about command arrangements.
” Marshall said, “Thank you, Prime Minister.” Churchill said, “In return the conversation you described about what can be decided within the framework.” Yes. Churchill said, “I want Brooke in that conversation. I would expect nothing less.” The conversation between Marshall and Brooke happened across two days, February 22nd and 23rd.
The War Office, a conference room that held four people comfortably, and six if necessary. It held Marshall Brooke Smith who had flown over with Marshall and two British planning officers whose names do not appear in any public account of the meeting. They discussed within the authorized framework the decisions that remain to be made.
Three outcomes emerged. The first was geographic. In the final advance east of the Rine, the British and Canadian sector would be positioned to reach Hamorg and the Baltic coast. This was already planned. Marshall confirmed that SH AEF would not adjust boundaries in a way that prevented 21st Army Group from reaching the Baltic before Soviet forces.
The second was Danish. There was concern that Soviet forces advancing through northern Germany might enter Denmark. The Baltic positioning of British forces, if executed at adequate speed, would preclude this. Marshall confirmed that adequate supply would be allocated to enable the speed required. The third was the least expected.
Brookke said there is a question about Czechoslovakia. Marshall said Pilson. Brookke said and beyond Pilson Prague. Marshall said what about Prague? Brookke described the Czech political situation, the government in exile, the question of which forces liberated the capital, the postwar implications of Soviet versus Allied liberation.
Marshall said, “What is Eisenhower’s current assessment?” Smith said he has not been given guidance on Prague. Marshall said then he needs guidance. He said, “If it is militarily feasible to reach Prague before Soviet forces and if that outcome serves the Allied interest, Eisenhower should be informed that it serves the Allied interest.
” Brookke said that is not a commitment. Marshall said it is as close to one as I can offer within the authorization. He said, “I will tell Eisenhower that allied governments have an interest in the Prague question. what he does with that information is an operational decision. Brookke said that may be sufficient.
It was not ultimately sufficient. Prague was liberated by Soviet forces in May 1945. The decision not to drive for Prague had already been made by the time Marshall’s guidance reached Eisenhower and the operational situation did not permit reversal. But the conversation had produced what conversations produced, a framework, a record, a set of understandings that shaped the decisions that could still be shaped.
Marshall flew back to Washington on February 24th. He wrote his notes on the flight, four pages, the cable, the meetings, the outcomes, the commitments. The final paragraph said, “The underlying tension in the Anglo-American relationship is not about military command arrangements. It is about the relationship between military decisions and political outcomes in the post-war world.
Britain is losing influence over those outcomes as American military power becomes dominant. The cable and the conversations that preceded it are expressions of that loss. He wrote, “I cannot restore what is being lost. The power balance has shifted. American resources are decisive and American strategic preferences follow from that decisiveness.
” He wrote, “What I can do is ensure that the conversations are honest and that British concerns are heard at the appropriate level before decisions are made. That is not the influence Churchill needs. It is the influence available.” He wrote, “The cable will not be sent again. The conversations will continue.
” He wrote, “It is the best outcome the situation permits. Brooke wrote in his diary that night, “Marshall came again. Two visits in three weeks. That tells you the seriousness of the situation from both sides.” He wrote, “He is the most precise man I have dealt with in this war. He hears the argument. He understands the argument.
He tells you honestly what he can and cannot do within his authorization.” He wrote, “Church finds him frustrating. I find him reliable. There is a difference.” He wrote, “We got the Baltic. We got the Danish question addressed. We got guidance on Prague that arrived too late to matter.” He wrote, “It is less than what was needed.
” He wrote, “It is what was available.” Churchill wrote about the checkers meeting in his memoirs with the careful omission that characterized everything he wrote about his relationship with American power in the final phase of the war. He wrote about Marshall in terms that were warm and precise, and that said in the language available to a man writing about a period that had not yet fully resolved itself into history, that the American chief of staff had been the most difficult ally of the war to argue with because he was always honest about
what he could not give. He wrote, “He never overpromised. He never gave false comfort. He told me what existed and declined to fabricate what did not. He wrote, “In the end, the conversation available is the conversation that matters. The conversation I needed was not available.” He wrote, “I have thought about that distinction for many years.
” The cable that had arrived on Marshall’s desk on the morning of February 19th was filed in the State Department archives. The meetings at the war office, the conversation at checkers, the four pages of notes on the flight home. All of it together was the diplomatic war that nobody saw.
The war fought in cables and conference rooms and country houses while the shooting war was fought in the Rhineland and the Rur and the streets of German cities. Both wars ended in May 1945. One of them with a surrender document, the other with an unwritten understanding that the post-war world would be shaped by the balance of the power that had won the shooting war, which was the American balance, and which Marshall had been honest about from the beginning.
That was the war beneath the war, and Marshall had fought it the only way he knew how, precisely, honestly, without giving what he could not Give.
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