At 0530 on December 16th, 1944, First Lieutenant Lyall Bu huddled in an ice covered foxhole on Lanzerat Ridge, scanning a column of 500 German paratroopers pushing out of the tree line below his position in Belgium. 20 years old, 3 months on the front, zero reinforcements inbound. The ninth Falsham Jagger regiment was moving toward his 18-man intelligence and reconnaissance platoon with orders to punch open the Losheim gap for the entire first SS Panzer Division masked behind them.
The opening day of the Battle of the Bulge had kicked off 90 minutes prior with 1,600 German artillery guns firing along an 80 mile front. Bu’s platoon held the sole American position, defending the vital road junction at Lanzerat. Behind them stretched unguarded roads running straight to Allied supply dumps and command posts. The 99th Infantry Division’s lines had been drawn so thin that Bu’s recon unit had been tasked with covering a 5mm gap intended for a full battalion.
No reserves were available. The closest American unit sat 6 miles away at Bukult station. Buased the arithmetic of his predicament right away. His platoon was equipped with standard infantry weapons, M1 Garand rifles, one Browning automatic rifle per squad, a single 30 caliber M1919 machine gun against 500 elite German paratroopers pushing forward in column formation across snow blanketed fields.
Those weapons would fall short. German intelligence had judged American soldiers as timid and reluctant to fight without air cover or armored support. The Vermach anticipated breaking through this sector within 2 hours and reaching the Muse River before dark. The 99th Infantry Division had reached the Arden just one month prior.
Most units had no combat experience. During the first week of December, the division had lost 47 men killed in action during limited patrol activity. Battalion commanders recognized their green troops would suffer devastating casualties if the Germans launched a full-scale offensive. Every soldier in Buke’s platoon knew what became of reconnaissance units that were overrun.
11 loaders had been killed. Thompson understood the pattern. Bu contacted regimental headquarters at Hooningan by radio and asked for permission to pull back. The answer arrived within 2 minutes. Stay in position. Reinforcements from third battalion will support you. But Bu knew no reinforcements would make it in time.
The German push had already severed telephone lines across the whole sector. His SCR300 radio was the only communication link to American forces. Four days before, Bu had made a choice that broke standard protocol for reconnaissance units. He had bartered captured German identity papers to the regimental ordinance officer in exchange for one armored jeep fitted with a Browning M2 50 caliber machine gun.
The M2 fired 12.7 mm rounds at 550 rounds per minute. Its effective range surpassed 1,800 m. The weapon could punch through light armor and suppress infantry advances across open terrain. Bu had set up the jeep at the center of his defensive line behind nine fox holes his men had carved into the slope. If you want to find out how Bu’s improvised jeep defense played out, please hit that like button.
It helps us share more forgotten stories from the Second World War. Subscribe if you haven’t already. Back to B. The Jeep was his platoon’s sole heavy weapon. Everything hinged on whether 18 men with rifles and 50 caliber machine gun could hold back 500 attacking paratroopers long enough to stall the German offensive. Bu glanced at his watch. 0645.
The German artillery bombardment had ceased 15 minutes ago. Through the morning haze, he could make out the Falima assembling in assault waves at the base of the ridge. His men settled into their fortified foxholes. Four forward artillery observers from Battery C 371st Field Artillery readied themselves to call for fire support.
The barbed wire strung across the snowy field below would slow the German advance but wouldn’t halt it. Bu knew the first assault wave would reach his line within minutes. He passed the order to hold fire until the enemy closed to 75 yards. At 0700 on December 16th, the lead elements of the 9th Famga Regiment started moving up the slope toward Lanzagat Ridge.
500 German paratroopers against 18 American soldiers and one jeep-mounted machine gun. By nightfall, one side would hold the road junction. The other would be dead or captured. The German paratroopers pushed forward in three distinct waves across the open ground below Bu’s position. Each wave comprised roughly 170 men moving in loose formation through kneedeep snow.
The lead wave hit the barbedwire fence at 75 yd from the American foxholes. Bu gave the command to open fire at 0715. The Browning M2 on the jeep spoke first. The gunner had pre-sighted his fields of fire the night before. The 50 caliber rounds ripped through the German formation at 2,840 ft pers.
Each projectile packed enough kinetic energy to defeat body armor at 1500 yd. At 75 yd, the effect was devastating. The opening burst killed 11 paratroopers in the point squad. The survivors threw themselves behind the barbed wire fence for cover. B’s riflemen engaged simultaneously with their M1 Garands. The intelligence and reconnaissance platoon had been handpicked because every man held an expert marksman qualification.
Several soldiers had attended college before the war through the army specialized training program. Their fire discipline proved critical in the opening minutes of the fight. While regular infantry units fired in volleys, BU’s men picked out individual targets. Germans trying to cut through the barbed wire became priority kills.
The first assault wave fell back after 8 minutes of sustained fire. Bou tallied 23 bodies scattered in the snow between the fence and the treeine. The Germans had anticipated minimal opposition from what their intelligence assessed as a thin screening force. Instead, they had run into precise rifle fire and heavy machine gun support from fortified positions.
The 9inth Falcium Regiment Commander pulled his men back to regroup at the foot of the ridge. At 0745, the second German assault wave came forward. This time, the paratroopers shifted tactics. They pushed squads forward, crawling through the snow to lay down covering fire while assault teams tried to flank the American position through the forest on either side of the ridge.
Bu shifted his Browning automatic rifle teams to guard the flanks. The M2 kept hammering targets in the open field. The four forward artillery observers from the 371st field artillery called for fire support. Lieutenant Warren Springer radioed coordinates for a barrage on the German staging area at the foot of the hill. No artillery came.
The American batteries were tied up across the entire front, dealing with the enormous German offensive. The 99th Infantry Division’s artillery had been assigned to other sectors where full regiments were under attack. Boo’s platoon would get no indirect fire support. The second assault lasted 19 minutes. German MG42 machine guns set up at the tree line and began hammering the American foxholes with sustained fire at,200 rounds per minute. The sound was unmistakable.
American soldiers called it Hitler’s buzzsaw, but the Germans couldn’t move forward while the M2 kept firing. Every attempt to cross the open ground drew immediate casualties. The snow-covered field offered zero concealment. The second wave pulled back at 0804. Bu took stock of his ammunition situation.
His men had burned through roughly 400 rounds during the first two assaults. Each soldier carried 80 rounds in clips and bandeliers. At the present rate of consumption, the platoon would exhaust its rifle ammunition before noon. The M2 had chewed through 200 rounds of its initial load of 550. The gunner reported the barrel temperature was nearing operational limits.
The Germans halted their assault for 37 minutes. During that window, Bu spotted enemy troops massing at three different locations around the foot of the ridge. The ninth Falsham regiment was staging a coordinated strike from multiple directions. His 18-man platoon would have to defend against simultaneous assaults on the front and both flanks.
The odds had just grown steeper. At 0841 on December 16th, 500 German paratroopers prepared for their third assault on Lanzerat Ridge. Bu’s men had less than half their ammunition left. The M2’s barrel glowed red from continuous firing, and reinforcements were still 6 milesi away with no means of reaching the isolated platoon.
The next attack would decide whether 18 Americans could keep holding the most critical road junction in the northern sector of the Battle of the Bulge. The third German assault kicked off at 0841 with coordinated pushes from three directions. Two squads of paratroopers advanced through the thick woods on the eastern flank while the main body attacked across the open field.
The 9inth Falshimeie regiment had thrown roughly 350 men into this wave. Their tactical doctrine stressed overwhelming force at the point of contact. German officers expected to overrun the American position within 15 minutes. Bu shifted his two Browning automatic rifle teams to engage the flanking squads pushing through the woods.
The BAR delivered 30 caliber rounds at 550 rounds per minute from 20 round magazines. In tight forest fighting, the weapon provided effective suppressive fire against advancing infantry, but the magazine capacity meant each gunner had to reload every 2 seconds of continuous fire. The flanking teams were slowed but not halted.
The M2 kept engaging targets in the open field. The gunner had switched to short controlled bursts to manage barrel temperature. Three round bursts every 4 seconds. This cut the rate of fire from 550 rounds per minute down to roughly 120, but accuracy went up considerably. Each burst zeroed in on specific German soldiers trying to push through the snow.
The psychological impact proved as significant as the body count. Paratroopers who watched their squad leaders get torn apart by 50 caliber fire lost drive in their assault. At 0900, a German mortar crew set up at the tree line and started lobbing high explosive rounds at the American foxholes. The 8 cm mortar shells landed in the snow around Buke’s defensive line.
Most went off harmlessly against the frozen earth or pine logs topping the foxholes. But the blasts forced his riflemen to duck for cover, cutting into their rate of accurate fire. The Germans had finally introduced indirect fire into the fight. Technical sergeant Peter Gaki from the forward artillery observer team tried to call for counter battery fire against the German mortar position.
His radio transmission got through to the 371st Field Artillery Battalion command post, but every American artillery battery in the sector had received priority fire missions backing units facing larger German assaults. The Battle of the Bulge involved more than 410,000 German troops attacking along an 80m front.
Bou’s 18-man platoon was one small position in an enormous offensive. Artillery support was not coming. The eastern flank assault drove to within 40 yards of the American foxholes before the bar teams shut it down. Private first class William James burned through three full magazines in rapid succession, dropping 11 German paratroopers.
The attackers pulled back into the woods at 0917. German casualties from the flanking attempt came to 19 killed or wounded. The snow made it impossible for the paratroopers to maneuver without giving away their positions. In the open field, the main assault wave had stalled at the barbed wire fence.
The M2 kept up suppressive fire across the kill zone. Every German soldier who tried to cut the wire became a target. Bodies piled up along the fence line. The American gunner estimated he had fired 420 rounds since the fight began at 0715. Roughly 130 rounds sat in the ammunition boxes. At the current rate of use, the M2 would go dry before 1100 hours.
Buoed regimental headquarters again at 0930. He reported his ammunition status and called for immediate resupply. The reply indicated no supply convoy could get through to Lanzavat while German forces held the roads. His platoon would have to ration ammunition and hold its ground with what it had. The order stayed the same.
Do not withdraw. The third German assault wave fell back at 0943 after 62 minutes of unbroken combat. Bu counted 41 enemy casualties visible in the snow between the tree line and his defensive line. The real German losses were higher. Wounded paratroopers had been dragged back during the assault. The ninth falsium regiment had now launched three attacks against a platoon-sized American force and been turned back each time.
But the arithmetic was unforgiving. Bu’s men had expended roughly 900 rounds of rifle ammunition. Each soldier had fewer than 30 rounds left. The M2 had 130 rounds remaining. The next German assault would likely be the last one his platoon could effectively withstand. And through his binoculars, Bu could see German officers rallying their troops at the bottom of the ridge for a fourth attack.
The fourth German assault launched at 1017. The 9th Fall Shima Regiment commander had reformed his battalion into one concentrated wave. Roughly 400 paratroopers moved forward simultaneously across the full width of the ridge. The tactic dropped flanking maneuvers in favor of swamping the American defensive line through raw numbers. German doctrine termed this approach concentration of force at the decisive point.
Bued the assault through his binoculars. The German formation spanned 200 yd across the snow covered field. Individual soldiers kept 10y gaps between positions. The spacing reduced losses from machine gun fire, but made coordination harder. Smoke grenades threw up patches of concealment across the battlefield.
The paratroopers had absorbed lessons from three previous failed assaults. This attack showed professional adaptation under fire. The M2 opened up at 150 yard. The gunner picked targets on the flanks first, trying to squeeze the German formation toward the center, where rifle fire could do maximum damage. The 50 caliber rounds cut through the smoke, striking paratroopers who thought they had cover, but the barrel temperature had hit critical levels.
After putting out 60 rounds, the gunner reported falling accuracy. The weapon kept functioning, but dispersion had grown significantly. Bu’s riflemen engaged targets at 100 yards. Each man singled out individual Germans and delivered aimed shots. The expert marksmanship that defined the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon proved decisive in this phase of the fight.
While the M2 laid down suppressive fire, the rifles accounted for the bulk of casualties. 16 Americans firing M1 Garens in semi-automatic mode could put out approximately 120 accurate rounds per minute against targets in open ground. The German formation hit the barbwire fence at 10:29. Paratroopers with wire cutters pushed forward under covering fire from MG42 teams stationed at the tree line.
For the first time in the battle, German soldiers managed to breach the wire obstacle. Three separate teams sliced openings through the fence. The assault wave poured through the gaps toward the American foxholes. At 10:32, the M2 burned through its last belt of ammunition. The gunner had stretched the remaining 130 rounds across 15 minutes of fighting.
When the weapon fell silent, the psychological shock wave rippled across both sides of the battlefield. German paratroopers who had spent 3 hours flinching from 50 caliber fire registered the shift instantly. Their rate of advance picked up. American riflemen stepped up their fire rate to make up for the loss of their heavy weapon.
Bu told his men to fix bayonets. The German assault had pushed to within 50 yards of the defensive line. Individual paratroopers were plainly visible through the thinning smoke. Some clutched stick grenades. Others readied themselves to rush the foxholes with submachine guns. The battle had shifted from long range precision fire to close quarters fighting.
Every American soldier knew what happened when German assault troops reached defensive positions. Private First Class Robert Lambert squeezed off his last clip at 1038. He grabbed for his ammunition bandelier and found it empty. Around the defensive perimeter, other soldiers reported the same situation.
The platoon had gone through approximately 1,200 rounds of rifle ammunition across 4 hours of sustained combat. Fewer than 200 rounds remained spread across 18 men. Some soldiers had five rounds left. Others had 15. Nobody had enough ammunition to maintain defensive fire for more than 3 minutes. The forward artillery observers made one last try at reaching American artillery support.
Technical Sergeant Peter Gaki sent coordinates for fire missions against the German assembly areas and the MG42 positions pinning down the American line. The 371st Field Artillery Battalion acknowledged the transmission but could not assign guns to support Lanzerat Ridge. Every available artillery piece was committed to backing regiment-sized units facing German armor and infantry assaults across the entire Arden front.
At 10:45 on December 16th, the fourth German assault hit peak intensity. 400 paratroopers bore down on defensive positions held by 18 Americans armed with fewer than 200 rifle rounds and no heavy weapons. The M2 stood silent on its Jeep mount. The barrel had discolored from heat damage. Bu knew his platoon could hold out for maybe 10 more minutes before ammunition gave out entirely.
The ninth Fshima regiment had taken over 90 casualties attacking this single ridge position, but the German commanders grasped the arithmetic. The Americans had to exhaust their ammunition sooner or later. And when they did, 500 paratroopers would sweep over 18 riflemen in minutes. Behind the German assault force, the first SS Panza division stood waiting for the infantry to secure the road junction.
so their tanks could roll toward the Miz River. Everything rode on the next 10 minutes at Lanzagat Ridge. The German paratroopers punched through the American defensive perimeter at 1053. A squad of 12 Falsham broke between two foxholes on the eastern flank where ammunition had given out first. The soldiers in those positions had spent their last rounds 2 minutes earlier.
They met the Germans with hand grenades and entrenching tools. One American soldier swung his rifle like a bat. Close quarters fighting in a defensive position against trained assault infantry seldom ended well for the defenders. Bal pulled three riflemen from the center of the line to seal the breach. These men still had rounds left.
They fired at point blank range into the German squad that had broken through the perimeter. Seven paratroopers went down. The surviving five fell back toward the wire, but the breach had exposed a fatal vulnerability. Once the Americans ran dry on ammunition, the Germans would overrun the position in minutes, no matter how much courage or tactical ability the defenders showed.
At 11:09, Bu made a call that went against every principle of reconnaissance unit doctrine. Instead of trying to pull back or hoard his remaining ammunition for a last stand, he ordered his men to fire at maximum rate. The logic seemed backwards. Burning through ammunition faster would shorten the clock until total depletion. But Bu understood the psychological side of the engagement.
As long as his platoon kept up heavy fire, the Germans would believe substantial defensive capacity was still in play. The riflemen fired as fast as they could pick out targets. M1 Garand rifles ran on a semi-automatic gas system that cycled automatically after each shot. A trained soldier could deliver 40 accurate rounds per minute given enough ammunition and targets.
For the next 8 minutes, BU’s remaining 14 men with ammunition poured sustained precision fire into the German assault. The paratroopers read the increased fire rate as proof of fresh ammunition supplies or reinforcements. The fourth German assault wave fell back at 11:21. The 9inth Falam Jagger regiment had thrown its entire battalion into four separate attacks over 4 hours.
Casualties now stood at 92 men killed, wounded, or missing. Officers reported to their division commander that the American position on Lansagot Ridge appeared to be held by a reinforced company backed by heavy weapons. German intelligence had failed to identify the actual size of the defending force.
The Vermacht was convinced it was hitting a well supplied defensive position rather than 18 men on the verge of running out of ammunition. Buan an ammunition count at 11:30. The numbers were dire. His entire platoon had 73 rounds of rifle ammunition between them. Some men had nothing. Others had five or six rounds. The M2 sat quiet with empty ammunition boxes littering the ground around the jeep.
The forward artillery observers had burned through their rifle ammunition, too. 22 Americans held the most critical road junction in the northern sector of the Battle of the Bulge with 73 rifle rounds. The temperature had fallen to 22° F. Snow kept falling across the ridge. Bu’s men had been in combat positions since ‘0530 with no food or water.
Several soldiers were showing signs of cold injury. Private First Class Risto Mallovich reported his feet had gone numb. Technical Sergeant William Slate had minor shrapnel wounds from German mortar fire, but not a single American had been killed. One forward artillery observer, technician fifth grade Billy Queen, had taken a round through his shoulder, but stayed at his position.
At 11:45, Bu spotted German officers gathering at the treeine with what looked like reinforcements. The 9th Falga regiment was being bolstered with fresh troops drawn from division reserve. Through his binoculars, he counted roughly 200 new paratroopers filing into assault positions. The Germans were gearing up for a fifth attack with rested troops against defenders sitting on 73 rounds of ammunition.
Buoed regimenal headquarters and laid out his situation. The answer came back within one minute. The third battalion could not get through to Lanzerat. German forces had severed all roads into the sector. Artillery support was still unavailable. The order held. Hold position. Do not withdraw. Bu acknowledged the transmission and went back to his foxhole.
The picture was bleak. His platoon had stalled the German offensive for more than 6 hours. They had inflicted close to 100 casualties on an elite airborne unit. But the math of ammunition consumption against attacking force size couldn’t be beaten forever. When the fifth German assault came, probably within the next 30 minutes, 18 Americans with 73 rifle rounds would face 400 fresh paratroopers.
The outcome was no longer uncertain. At 12:15 on December 16th, 1944, Lyall Bu watched German assault troops assemble for their fifth attack on Lanzerat Ridge. His men had fought longer and harder than anyone had a right to expect, but physics and arithmetic were about to settle the battle’s outcome.
The question was no longer whether the Germans would seize the position. The question was how many more hours B’s platoon could hold up the first SS Panzer Division’s drive toward the Muse River. The fifth German assault started at 1237. Roughly 400 paratroopers moved forward in a modified formation built for speed over spacing.
The ninth Falsham regiment had thrown its reserve companies into this attack. Fresh troops who had sat out the previous four assaults crossed the snow-covered field with the assurance of soldiers who believed they faced a spent enemy. German intelligence kept overestimating American strength on the ridge.
Bu split the remaining 73 rounds of ammunition across his platoon. Soldiers with marksmanship qualifications got priority. Men without ammunition were told to grab rifles and bandeliers from casualties if the chance arose. The defensive plan had boiled down to its most basic form. Shoot until the ammunition is gone.
Then fight with bayonets and grenades. No other options existed. The American riflemen held their fire until the Germans closed to 60 yards. At that distance, every round had to matter. The opening volley dropped 11 paratroopers. The Germans instantly hit the ground and started returning fire with rifles and MG42 machine guns.
But without the suppressive fire of the M2, the Americans couldn’t keep the German advance from gaining ground inch by inch. Squad by squad, the paratroopers crept forward through the snow using fire and maneuver tactics. At 1251, three German soldiers reached a foxhole on the western flank where the occupants had used up their ammunition.
The Americans fought with entrenching tools and bare fists. One paratrooper dropped with a crushed skull. The other two pulled back after taking knife wounds, but the incident showed how close the battle had come to hand-to-hand fighting across the whole defensive line. The Germans were now within grenade range of multiple positions.
Bu tallied his remaining rounds, 16. Around the perimeter, his men were at similar levels. Some soldiers had already attached bayonets in preparation for the final stage of the fight. The forward artillery observers kept calling for fire support even though no artillery was coming. Technical sergeant Peter Gaki transmitted targeting data every 5 minutes as though sheer repetition might somehow yield results. It didn’t.
The German assault built momentum at 1300. Paratroopers had cut through the wire barrier at four separate points. Small teams of three to five men pushed toward the American foxholes using smoke grenades for cover. The defenders spent their remaining ammunition on these assault teams. Each round dropped or wounded a German soldier, but the arithmetic stayed merciless.
73 rounds spread across 400 attackers meant the vast majority of Germans would reach the American line untouched. At 1314, Private First Class William James fired the last round from his M1 Garand. The distinctive ping of the ejecting clip signaled an empty weapon. He reached for his bayonet and braced for close combat.
Around the defensive perimeter, other soldiers were hitting the same wall. The battle of Lanservat Ridge had entered its final minutes as an ammunition-based defense. What came next would hinge on hand grenades and cold steel. Bu squeezed off his final rounds at 1317. 18 rifle bullets remained scattered among 22 Americans.
The M2 stood mute on its Jeep mount. The forward artillery observers had nothing left for their carbines. For the first time in 6 hours of unbroken combat, the American defensive fire dwindled to isolated single shots. German officers caught the change instantly and sent their assault teams rushing forward. At 1320, roughly 50 German paratroopers charged the American foxholes simultaneously from three directions.
The defenders hurled grenades and fired their last rifle rounds. Several Germans dropped, but the assault wave closed to within 20 yards of the defensive line. Bu could make out individual faces, young men in their 20s, professional soldiers carrying out assault doctrine against a position they had been ordered to take 6 hours earlier.
The Americans readied themselves for the final stand. Bayonets fixed, grenades armed, entrenching tools gripped. Every man knew the next two minutes would decide whether they lived or died. The Vermacht had no reputation for showing mercy to units that had inflicted heavy losses. 92 German paratroopers had been killed or wounded storming this ridge.
The survivors would not be disposed toward leniency. At 1323 on December 16th, the Battle of Lanzovat Ridge hit its climax. 50 German assault troops bore down on 18 American defenders who had no ammunition left. The six-hour fight that had stalled the entire northern wing of the B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B, B of the Bulge was about to end in close quarters combat on a frozen hillside in Belgium.
The German paratroopers overran the first American foxhole at 1326. Three Falchamga dropped into the position where two soldiers had burned through all their ammunition. Hand-to-h hand fighting lasted 8 seconds. One German went down with a bayonet driven through his chest. The two Americans took knife wounds but kept fighting.
A German officer dragged one of them out of the foxhole at gunpoint. The Vermacht had finally cracked the defensive perimeter after 6 hours of relentless assault. More German troops flooded through the brereech. Bu told his men to stop fighting and surrender. Continuing resistance without ammunition would mean the deaths of soldiers who had already done far more than anyone had asked of them.
At 1332, 18 Americans from the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon and four forward artillery observers put their hands up. The battle of Lanzarat Ridge was over after 7 hours and 57 minutes of continuous combat. The German losses were plainly visible across the snow-covered battlefield. 92 bodies lay between the treeine and the American foxholes.
Some had fallen at the barbed wire fence. Others had dropped during the assault waves. The 9inth Falsham Jagger regiment had lost 16% of its fighting strength, attacking a position defended by 22 men. Battalion commanders reported to division headquarters that they had overwhelmed a reinforced American company equipped with heavy weapons.
Technical sergeant William Slate had taken shrapnel during the battle, but was still on his feet. 14 other members of Buke’s platoon had been hit by rifle fire, grenade fragments, or mortar shrapnel. Only one American had died. Technician fifth grade Billy Queen from the forward artillery observer team had been killed manning a machine gun position during the fourth German assault.
The casualty ratio stood at 92 Germans killed or wounded against one American killed and 14 wounded. The German soldiers who seized the American position were stunned by the small size of the defending force. A falam sergeant inspected the silent M2 on the jeep and asked Bu how many machine guns his unit had.
When Bued the single 50 caliber weapon, the sergeant wouldn’t believe him. German doctrine held that sustained heavy machine gun fire required multiple weapons with overlapping fields of fire and ammunition resupply. The idea that one machine gun crewed by exhausted soldiers could produce such defensive results went against everything in their training.
At 1400, the German battalion commander reached the captured position. He directed his medical personnel to treat American and German wounded without distinction. The Falamie set up aid stations in houses within Lanserat village. Bu and his men received medical care for their wounds before being readied for transport to prisoner of war facilities.
The German officer who took Bu’s surrender recognized that the American defense had been carried out with professional competence. The tactical consequences of the 7-hour battle became clear over the following hours. The first SS Panzer Division spearhead, Conf Group of Piper, had been slated to pass through Lancavat at 0800.
The armored column comprised 4,800 men, 600 vehicles, and more than 100 tanks. Their mission was to reach the Muse River by nightfall on December 16th. But the infantry regiment tasked with clearing the route had been pinned down at Lancavat Ridge by 18 American soldiers. Conf Group of Piper did not reach Lancavat until midnight on December 17th, 16 hours behind schedule.
The delay rippled through the entire German offensive plan. The northern wing of the Battle of the Bulge, which Hitler had marked as the main effort, bled critical momentum during the first day. Instead of pushing 60 m toward Antworp as planned, the first SS Panzer division covered less than 10 m before running into reinforced American positions.
The German commanders at the ridge had stalled their advance after taking Bou’s platoon. They were convinced the woods behind the American position held additional forces and armor. The heavy casualties absorbed during 7 hours of fighting pointed to significant defensive depth. German reconnaissance patrols crept through the forest expecting to run into tanks and reinforcements. They found empty woods.
But the delay proved decisive. At 16:30 on December 16th, 1944, Lyall Bu and his wounded platoon started their march into German captivity. They had defended Lanzeroth Ridge for over 11 hours against 500 attacking paratroopers. They had inflicted 92 casualties while losing one killed and 14 wounded. And they had set back the main German armored thrust by 16 hours.
But none of them knew that yet. As prisoners of war, they believed they had failed. The true significance of their stand at Lanzagat Ridge would not come to light for decades. The German soldiers packed Bu and his wounded platoon into box cars at Junkarath. 2 days after the battle, 72 American prisoners of war were crammed into a single cattle car built for 40 men.
The train headed east into Germany without food or water. Temperatures inside the box car fell below freezing. By Christmas Day, seven men in B’s car had died from wounds, exposure, or dehydration. The survivors were shipped to prisoner of war camps at Nuremberg, Hammelberg, and Mooseberg. B spent 5 months in German captivity.
Conditions worsened as the Vermacht fell apart during early 1945. Food rations shrank to watery soup once a day. Allied bombing raids hit rail lines and supply depots near the prison camps. German guards grew increasingly hostile as their country faced defeat. Many prisoners came down with hepatitis, dysentery or pneumonia.
When American forces liberated the camps in April 1945, Bu weighed 112 lb. He had weighed 165 lb on December 16th. The soldiers from the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon came home believing they had failed at Lanzovat. Bu viewed the wounding of 14 men and the capture of his entire unit as a total tactical failure.
He had no idea his platoon had set back the first SS Panzer Division by 16 hours. He had no idea the northern wing of the Battle of the Bulge had fallen critically behind schedule because of the stand at Lanzavat Ridge. All he knew was that he had been captured after his ammunition ran out. The platoon scattered after the war.
Soldiers went back to civilian life across America. Nobody talked about Lanzavat Ridge. The battle had been eclipsed by larger engagements during the Battle of the Bulge. Baston drew international attention. The Malady Massacre triggered war crimes trials. But an 18-man reconnaissance platoon that defended a ridge for 7 hours vanished into the historical record without recognition.
In 1965, the United States Army released a multi-olume history titled The Arden: The Battle of the Bulge. Author Hugh Cole referenced Buke’s platoon briefly with scant detail. Private First Class William James, who had fought at Lanzerat, read the short mention and grew frustrated at the lack of recognition.
He reached out to Bu and urged his former lieutenant to pursue proper acknowledgement for the platoon’s actions. Bu sent letters to his former division commander, Major General Walter Lowour, requesting that his men receive decorations for their defense of Lanzerat Ridge. In June 1966, a Silver Star showed up in Bu’s mailbox, but no other member of the platoon was recognized.
Buused to accept an individual medal when his entire unit had fought as one. He launched a 15-year campaign to make sure every soldier received proper recognition. The effort demanded congressional hearings, letterw writing campaigns, and interviews with military historians. John Eisenhower chronicled the battle in detail for his book, The Bitter Woods.
Columnist Jack Anderson wrote about the forgotten platoon in national publications. Gradually, the historical weight of Lanzerat Ridge came into focus. 18 men with one jeep-mounted machine gun had stopped 500 attacking paratroopers for 7 hours and stalled an entire SS Panzer Division during the critical first day of Germany’s last major offensive.
On October 26th, 1981, the United States Army officially recognized the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon’s actions at Lanzerat Ridge. Every member of the unit received decorations. Four soldiers, including Bu were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Five received silver stars. 10 received bronze stars with V device for valor.
The entire platoon received the presidential unit citation. The decorations made BU’s platoon the most decorated American unit of its size for a single action in World War II. 37 years had elapsed between the battle and the recognition. Some soldiers from the platoon had passed away without knowing their sacrifice had been acknowledged.
William James, who had started the campaign for recognition, died in 1977 after 37 surgeries to repair wounds sustained at Lanzat. But the surviving members finally understood they had not failed. They had accomplished something extraordinary. If this story moved you the way it moved us, do me a favor. Hit that like button. Every single like tells YouTube to show this story to more people.
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