US Empire: American Expansionism In the WW1 Era

US Empire: American Expansionism In the WW1 Era

After the United States became independent in the late 18th century, the country expanded rapidly through a combination of land purchases, w4rs of conquest, and border deals with Great Britain. By the late 19th century, the US stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the Arctic. From the 1890s though, a new wave of American expansion began that resulted in a vast overseas empire.

Expansionists in politics, the military and business felt that the United States should join other imperial powers on the world stage in their view for prestige to spread Christianity and civilization and to further US business interests. Navy captain and strategist Alfred the Mahan explained, “Whether they will or not, Americans must now begin to look outw4rd.

The growing production of the country requires it. The repeated recessions and economic uncertainty of the 1890s meant that some politicians feared unrest at home if they didn’t expand markets and win distracting victories abroad. In 1895 and 1899, the US risked conflict with Britain and Germany over border and ocean navigation disputes in South America and the Pacific.

US foreign policy supported the interests of powerful companies like United Fruit in Central America and John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil. Our amba.ssadors and ministers and consils have aided to push our way into new markets and to the utmost corners of the world. American missionaries also spread US presence and influence, especially in China.

But it was closer to home in the Caribbean where America’s first overseas w4r of empire would begin. Throughout the 19th century, the United States became interested in increasing its influence over the nearby island of Cuba. Spain had ruled the island for centuries. But by the 1800s, Spain was a power in decline. In the 1810s, most former Spanish colonies in the Americas gained independence, but not Cuba, and Washington worried that another European power might sweep in and seize the territories.

So, President James Monroe introduced what later became known as the Monroe Doctrine. In 1823, the US pledged to protect the political status quo in the Americas. American businessmen looked to Cuba’s economic potential as well, especially southern cotton and sugar plantation owners.

In the following decades, Cubans rose up in several revolutions against Spanish rule, often under the slogan of Kuba Libé, free Cuba. Spain sent tens of thousands of troops to suppress them. As US interest in Cuba increased, so did tensions with Spain. The US offered to buy the island on several occasions, and newspapers and school textbooks portrayed Spain as backw4rd and cruel.

In 1873, w4r was barely avoided after Spanish authorities ex3cuted 58 sailors, including US citizens, for alleged g.unrunning in support of the Cuban revolutionaries. In 1895, Cubans again rose up against Spanish rule. This time under leaders Jose Marti, Maximo Gomez, and Antonio Mo, who had founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party from the US a few years earlier.

They and many islanders were unhappy with Spanish corruption, economic decline partially caused by US tariffs on sugar and the suspension of civil liberties. The rebels used scorched earth and guerilla tactics, 4mbushing Spanish troops and putting plantations to the torch to force the Spanish to leave.

The strategy seemed to be working as Spanish Captain General Martinez Campos admitted. I have failed, but no force can crush this rebellion. There is a spirit at work here which defies the bayonet. I predict that soon this island will be lost to us forever. In response, the Spanish sent General Baladiano Wer, whose repressive tactics earned him the nickname the butcher.

Through his policy of reconentration, 100,000 Cubans would d1e in filthy and disease ridden camps. The US tabloid media, the so called Yellow Press, covered the atrocities, both real and imagined, in grizzly detail. New York Journal owner William Randph Hurst responded to criticism that his paper exaggerated Spanish actions.

It would be difficult to exaggerate conditions in Cuba. We merely took a little dr4matic license. Our editors were only serving the interests of the public. Americans h@te Spain, so we gave them something to stew about. So Cuba was racked by revolution and Spanish repression while the United States looked on.

Many Americans demanded action, but Washington was hesitant. When President William McKinley was elected in 1897, he favored a diplomatic solution. The same year McKinley became president, a more liberal Spanish government came to power in Madrid. They recalled General Wher and promised reforms in Cuba to calm critics in Spain and in the US.

Cayano Balinia, a bl4cksmith from San Adriano, reported on scenes that he witnessed in Spain that showed the impact of the w4r. Yesterday, I was in Behold to buy some necessary stuff and saw a horrible scene at the port. It was covered in coffins that were being unloaded from the ships. How many people will have to d1e before this d@mn w4r that is ha.rming the nation so much will end? At this point though, the Cuban revolutionaries were no longer responsive to vague Spanish promises of reform and they demanded full

independence. The crisis rapidly came to a head in 1898. In early February, Hurst’s newspapers released a leaked memo from the Spanish amba.ssador to the US which was starkly critical of President McKinley. McKinley is a weak bidder for the admiration of the crowd. A wouldbe politician who tries to leave the door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingo of his party.

But even more incendiary was the sinking of a US ship, the main in the port of Havana. Some Americans suspected the ship was sunk by the Spanish, but in reality it probably sank because of an internal explosion. In any case, the combination of 269 US lives lost on the main and the diplomatic insult piled pressure on McKinley.

He resisted calls for w4r, but business owners, media pundits, and other politicians demanded action. Assistant Secretary of the Navy and future President Theodore Roosevelt did not hold back in his criticism of McKinley. McKinley has the backbone of a chocolate declare. The president was facing a potential rebellion within his own Republican party.

So, he gave in to the pressure on April 11th. He asked Congress for authorization to intervene and sent Spain an ultimatum demanding that troops evacuate Cuba and give up Spanish sovereignty over the island. The Spanish accepted some points of the ultimatum, but they refused on the issue of Cuban independence. On April 21st, 1898, the US started a blockade of Cuba.

So, the Spanish declared w4r on the United States April 23rd. The US also declared w4r 2 days later. What Senator John Haye would describe as a quote splendid little w4r had beg.un. So, the Cuban crisis led to the start of the Spanishamean W4r in April 1898. America was at w4r, but its goals were not yet entirely clear, and the US military was not entirely prepared.

American leaders argued about what they wanted to achieve from the w4r against Spain. Expansionists suggested the US annex Spanish possessions, but anti imperialists opposed this idea. Eventually, Senator Henry Teller demanded an amendment denying any US intention to annex Cuba. This move angered expansionists, but Congress approved it with little opposition.

Regardless of US w4r aims and high public expectations, the actual military situation was less promising for the Americans. In April 1898, the US Army had just 28,000 men and the larger state militias were poorly trained and not suitable for overseas duty. As a result, the government announced a huge military spending increase and a call for volunteers.

The W4r Department wanted 125,000 new troops, but by August, 290,000 had signed up. One of the most famous volunteers was Teddy Roosevelt himself. He resigned his Navy position to join the first volunteer cavalry known as the Ruff Riders. US officer John H. Parker described the unusual nature of the unit. The Ruff Riders were the most unique aggregation of f1ghting men ever gathered together in any army.

There were cowboys, bankers, brokers, merchants, city clubmen, and society dudes commanded by a doctor. Second in command, a literary politician, but every man determined to get into the f1ght. The flood of US volunteers also created problems. Training camps became overcrowded, spreading diseases like typhus and scarlet fever.

Equipping all the men was also an issue. Although federal troops had adopted the modern Norwegian designed bolt action Krag Jurgensen rifle, many US sold1ers were still equipped with the obsolete M1873 trapdoor Springfield, which fired bl4ck powder cartridges. There was also a lack of tropical equipment, so some sold1ers wore woolen winter uniforms.

Meanwhile, the Spanish had 130 to 160,000 men, although there was a great divergence in morale and in training. But the Spaniards were armed with the excellent M1893 Mouser rifle and smokeless ammunition and had far more experience in Cuban conditions. Armies take time to train and mobilize and so immediate attention turned to the navies.

With the US Navy blockading the island, Spanish Admiral Pasual Therbera Etopete sailed for Cuba from Kadis. Despite the strong Spanish naval tradition, Admiral Fera was not optimistic about his chances. The US Navy had rapidly expanded and modernized in recent years with steelplated cruisers and b4ttleships faster and better armed than anything that the Spanish had.

Do we owe to our country not only our life if necessary, but the exploitation of our beliefs? I am very uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right to make myself an accomplice in an adventure which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours but belongs to us no more? To lose all our wealth and an enormous number of young men in the defense of what is now no more than a romantic idea.

The Spanish and US navies were on a collision course in the Caribbean. But the first sh0ts of the w4r at sea would end up being fired 16,000 km away near a different Spanish possession in a different ocean. The Philippine Islands had been a Spanish colony since the 1570s and also saw a series of uprisings in the 19th century as well as the growth of a short lived peaceful independent movement known as La Liga Filipina.

Unlike Cuba, however, before the w4r, the islands received little US attention as President McKinley admitted to a reporter. I can’t tell you within 500 miles where the Philippine Islands are located. And what’s more, I don’t care. They are of no concern to the United States. However, Manila with its large natural harbor was home to the Spanish Asiatic Fleet, a potential thre4t to US interests.

According to Washington, even before the declaration of w4r, Commodore George Dwiey’s US Aatic Fleet was ordered to prepare for operations and contact potential allies among the Filipinos. In 1896, a revolt of largely Tagalog speaking Filipinos broke out in Louson under the command of Emilio Agginaldo. After a bl00dy guerilla campaign, the Spanish cut a deal with the rebel leader in exchange for $850,000, over $30 million in today’s money and promises of reform.

Aguinonaldo went into exile. But by 1898, only half the money had been paid. No reforms had been implemented. And so he continued to agitate rebels in the Philippines from abroad. Dwey now contacted Aguinonaldo and asked him to help a US invasion. Agenaldo accepted, but the terms of their agreement would cause long term issues.

Agenaldo claimed that Dwey and Colonel Wood promised him a Filipino republic after victory. The Americans later said they made no such promise, and historians are still divided on the issue. Regardless, by late April 1898, Agginaldo was contacting his f1ghters for a renewed @ttack, while Dwey moved against the Spanish fleet in Manila.

Like his Atlantic counterpart, the Spanish commander, Admiral Patricio Monto, was pessimistic. His fleet was decrepit with just two protected cruisers, five unprotected cruisers, and five g.unboats. Although he had the protection of coastal g.uns and the harbor, his mines were defective, and the US g.uns outranged his. Mano expected defeat, so he planned to f1ght in shallow water.

As he explained to a colleague, “When the Americanos sink our ships, the masts will protrude out of the water. Our sailors can climb to the top and wait in safety until rescued. Otherwise, everyone might drown. In the early hours of May 1st, Dwiey’s four protected cruisers and two g.unboats slipped into Manila Harbor, where they engaged the Spanish at 5:40 a.m.

The Spanish ships opened fire with an ineffective broadside, after which the US ships returned fire. The Americans @ttacked the Spanish fleet five times, and the Spanish flagship Rea Christina even tried to charge the US vessels, but was racked by American fire. By midm morning, the one sided b4ttle was over.

Some Spanish ships ran themselves ashore, and overall 381 Spaniards were k1lled or wounded. US casualties are not entirely clear, but were very low. Some claimed only one American sailor d1ed, and that from a heart @ttack. Dwiey’s victory was the first of the w4r for the US and made him into a national hero, but he couldn’t occupy Manila.

Privately, many US officers were disappointed with their performance. Of the roughly 6,000 sh3lls that they’d fired, only 145 hit their targets. By midMay, the US was building up an invasion force in San Francisco, but the other powers were quicker. Before the US fleet arrived, British, French, German, and Japanese ships arrived to observe the situation and potentially take advantage of any Spanish loss of control.

So with the Spanish Asatic fleet defeated and Manila surrounded, attention shifted back to Cuba. By May 19th, Admiral Therbera slipped past the US fleet and entered Santiago de Kuba Bay. But then a US fleet under Rear Admiral William T. Samson trapped the Spanish in the bay, which cleared the way for American amphibious landings.

With the bulk of Spanish forces around Havana, the US strategy would focus on an invasion of the southeast coast between Daikiri and Sibonet. American troops could then join with Cuban rebels and thre4tened the fleet in Santiago. General William Shaer was in command of the US invasion force, but at 140 kg and suffering from gout, he was not an ideal choice for the tropical climate.

He did however have experience in the US Civil W4r and in the w4rs against Native Americans. In early June, US Marines est4blished a coing station at Guantanamo Bay before the main US invasion force arrived on June 22nd. Their landings were uncontested with the only casualties resulting from accidents.

Instead, the US troops were received by Cuban rebel commander Kalixo Garcia. Despite initial friendly greetings, relations quickly soured. The Cubans were in a more difficult state than the Americans expected them to be based on US media illustrations. Many officers, including Roosevelt, were extremely critical. The Cuban insurgents were a crew of as utter tattered as human eyes ever looked on.

armed with every kind of rifle in all stages of dilapidation. It was evident at a glance that they would be of no use in serious f1ghting, but it was hoped that they might be of service in scouting. From a variety of causes, however, they turned out to be nearly useless even for that. The Americans also thought that the Cubans were cow4rds since the rebels were reluctant to face the Spaniards in open b4ttle.

Garcia protested against these charges in a letter to Sh@ter. We are a poor, ragged army, as ragged and poor as was the army of your forefathers in their noble w4r for independence. But like the heroes of Saratoga and Yorktown, we respect our cause too deeply to disgrace it with barbarism and cow4rdice. These American attitudes tow4rds the Cuban f1ghters are not fully justified.

The rebels were mostly an irregular guerilla force sk1lled at 4mbushes rather than a.ssaults against entrenched Spanish troops. Despite Cuban misgivings, Sh@ter ordered his troops tow4rd the village of Lasimas on June 24th. The Americans advanced in two columns, regular troops on the road and the Rough Riders, mostly as dismounted cavalry moving through the jungle.

Soon they ran into Spanish troops and a firef1ght ensued. Although the Spaniards smokeless powder gave them an edge in the f1ghting, after a two hour b4ttle, the Spaniards made a planned withdrawal. As they did so, American officer Joe Wheeler, who was a former Confederate general, reportedly shouted that he had quote the d@mn Yankees on the run.

The Americans had defeated the Spanish in the first Cuban combat, but their commanders were divided. Admiral Samson wanted Sh@ter to clear the coastal batteries around Santiago for the Navy. But instead, Sh@ter decided to @ttack the city himself. For Sh@ter, speed was the key to taking Santiago since disease had already beg.un to spread among the US troops.

Blocking the way to the city, however, were Spanish positions on the San Juan Heights. The Spanish had fortified the village of Elcan and had prepared trenches, blockhouses, and artillery on Kettle Hill and San Juan Hill. The US plan was for about 5,400 troops under Brigad1er General Henry Lton to @ttack Elcan and force out the defenders in just 2 hours.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the force would @ttack the heights and pin down any Spanish reinforcements on their way to Elcan. Once through, Lton planned to pursue the retreating Spaniards. all the way to Santiago. On July 1st, Lton began the main @ttack at around 6:30 a.m., but immediately it became clear that he’d underestimated the Spanish defenders.

Despite being outnumbered 10 to1, the Spaniards held off US troops for 8 hours. With no breakthrough imminent, more US troops moved in, including the Rough Riders, but artillery support was minimal. Most of the US g.uns were obsolete and Spanish shrapnel had already suppressed several g.un crews and sh0t down an American observation balloon.

The US did have an experimental dynamite g.un which used compressed air to fire explos1ves, but it was stuck in a nearby gorge. Spanish sharpshooters and fire from the trenches bogged down the advancing US troops. As casualties mounted, the Americans tried another novel w3apon to break the de@dlock. Gatling g.uns on lightweight wheeled mounts.

US officers sent these 10barreled handc cranked automatic w3apons up to the front to suppress the Spanish trenches. The covering fire of the Gatling g.uns allowed US infantry to get within a.ssaulting range of the Spanish positions and the sound of the rapid fire also raised US morale. US Lieutenant John Gatling Gun Parker commanded the Gatling detachment and later wrote fid praise for the w3apon.

At this time the Gatling g.un began to talk. It spoke very valuable and eloquent orations which although not delivered in the Spanish language were well understood by our friends the enemy upon the hill. At around 100 p.m. American forces stormed the hills. The Ruff Riders along with the African American Buffalo sold1ers of the 9th and 10th Cavalry @ttacked Kettle Hill while the First Division took on San Juan Hill.

They broke through the barbed wire, entered the Spanish trenches, and cleared them in close quarters f1ghting. First Kettle Hill fell, then San Juan, which made the Spanish position in Elcane impossible to hold. The Spanish counter@ttacked in the afternoon, but the intense US rifle and Gatling fire stopped them.

The surv1ving Spanish forces retreated to Santiago. The storming of the San Juan Heights also cemented Roosevelt’s reputation as a daring w4r hero and the order to storm the hills is often attributed to him. However, although Roosevelt took part in the a.ssault, the actual order came from Lieutenant Colonel John Miley. The US capture of the San Juan positions marked the end of significant f1ghting in Cuba.

On July 3rd, Admiral Thurbera, fearing a.ssault from both land and sea, attempted to escape the harbor, but the superior US Navy destr0yed his fleet. Spanish Lieutenant Hakeim Bame recalled the effect of the American g.uns. One sh3ll cut the Bow Swain in half and part of his body fell into the steering control line and as a result, we lost partial rudder control and had to clear the body from the steering control line.

Next, a sh3ll destr0yed the steam governor. A third exploded on the poop deck magazine and destr0yed it. On the 17th, Santiago surrendered after a short siege, although the Americans banned the Cuban rebels from attending the surrender ceremony at Spanish requests. The w4r in Cuba was over. It cost 385 American and 800 Spanish lives in combat and about 5,000 Americans would eventually d1e from disease.

The US also targeted Spanish ruled Puerto Rico. The island could be used as a strategic base in the Caribbean, including to protect the Panama Canal. In the years leading up to the w4r, the US government and business interests had pressured the Spanish to allow Puerto Rico more autonomy with the goal of increasing US influence there.

Puerto Ricans were divided between those who wanted autonomy but under Spanish rule, outright independence or annexation by the US. Many anticipated a US invasion even before the w4r began, like exiled independent supporter Rammonio Betansis. It’s extremely important that when the first troops of the United States reach shore, they should be received by Puerto Rican troops waving the banner of independence and greeting them.

Let the Americans cooperate in the achievement of our freedom, but not push the country tow4rd annexation. If Puerto Rico does not move quickly, it will be an American colony forever. The US Navy had blockaded the capital of San Juan since May. even beating off a Spanish naval @ttack in June. Now on July 25th, 1898, US troops landed at Guanika with little Spanish resistance.

Several small skirmishes took place, including at Kuamo, Farardo, Sanman, and Ibonito. Though the Spanish and Puerto Ricans delayed the American advance and even pushed them back out of a few towns, US forces maintained their advance until the ceasefire on August 13th. Military hostilities lasted just 19 days, and f1ghting was so light that only three American and 17 Spanish sold1ers were k1lled before US forces took complete control of the island.

Some Puerto Ricans welcomed the Americans with parades and fireworks, while others, especially peasants, took the opportunity to loot or burn plantations and even murd3red some plantation owners they saw as oppressive. Major General Nelson A. miles appealed to the population. We have not come to make w4r upon the people of a country that for centuries has been oppressed, but on the contrary to bring you protection not only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your prosperity and bestow upon

you the immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our government. With Cuba and Puerto Rico secured for the United States, American attention now shifted back to the Philippines. In late June, US troops captured the Spanish held island of Guam before landing 10,000 men at Cavete in the Philippines on July 1st.

The Spanish had tried to mobilize local civilians to support their cause. But Agaldo’s Filipino rebels had far more support and the loyalty of many Filipino sold1ers who were supposed to be serving Spain. In fact, at this point, the rebels had already surrounded Manila, but their relationship with the Americans was cool.

Some US businessmen and politicians were calling for the annexation of the Philippines, which worried the Filipinos. A concerned Agginaldo ignored US advice and announced Filipino independence on June 18th. He also wrote to the US console general. I have read in the New York Evening Journal that I am getting a big head and not behaving as I promised you.

In reply, I ask, why should America expect me to outline my policy present and future and f1ght bl1ndly for her interests when America will not be frank with me? Tell me this. Am I f1ghting for annexation, protection, or independence? It is for America to say, not me. With relations worsening, US General Wesley Merritt moved ahead without support from Aguinaldo’s insurgents.

By August 6th, he was discussing surrender with the Spanish Governor General Fermmines Yalvarez. Howenz wanted to surrender to the Americans, but was concerned about punishment for not contesting the city. In the end, he requested a quasi staged b4ttle to give a pretense of resistance. Merritt agreed, and on August 13th, US g.uns b0mbarded an unmanned Spanish fort.

Even so, in some places, the f1ght was indeed real, and six US troops and an unverified number of Spaniards were k1lled. US volunteer sold1er George Telur wrote about the charade. We call it a comic opera w4r. There was really no need of k1lling anybody. The Spanish Army Code makes de4th the penalty for an officer who surrenders his post without a f1ght.

So you see, there had to be a f1ght, but it was not where it was likely to damage property. In reality, even this staged b4ttle was unnecessary. Unbeknownst to both sides in Manila, Spain and America had already signed a ceasefire in Washington. In the final peace treaty signed in December, Spain seated Guam and Puerto Rico to the United States.

Cuba became independent, although a US military administration would oversee the island for the time being. The US also bought the Philippines from Spain for $20 million, over $700 million today, and Spanish administrators would temporarily stay in place. McKinley claimed that US control would bring infrastructure and peace to the islands, although commercial interests, concerns of other nations seizing the Philippines, and McKinley’s religious convictions more likely drove the decision. So, the United States had

defeated Spain and acquired new territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific, but many Filipinos were not interested in American rule. The peace deal, which excluded the Cubans and Filipinos, was the last straw for Filipino rebel Agenaldo. On January 23rd, 1899, Agenaldo approved the constitution for an independent Philippine Republic, and Filipino forces around Manila rose up against the Americans on February 4th.

Ainaldo was clear as to his reasons. It is my unavoidable duty to maintain the integrity of the national honor and that of the army so unjustly @ttacked by those who posing as our friends and liberators attempted to dominate us in place of the Spaniards. The revolutionaries were no match for US forces, but they retreated into the mountains and began to wage a guerilla w4r.

By summer, 35,000 US troops were attempting to suppress the so called Philippines insurrection. By June 1901, Filipino f1ghters had launched 1,000 @ttacks against US forces. US sold1er George Teler described the nature of the jungle f1ghting. The enemy opened up on us. We would lay down and fire, then get up and advance. As we advanced, the enemy would retire and it became a foot race.

The native can run faster than we can and we could not get within a thousand yards of him. We halted every half hour and rested. We burned every house we pa.ssed. This kind of US repression became commonplace. General Jacob Smith ordered his troops to turn Lon into a quote howling wilderness by moving civilians into concentration camps.

American troops arr.ested military aged Filipino men, some of whom they sumearily ex3cuted. In March 1901, US forces captured Aginaldo himself. His movement had been defeated and his own reputation damaged because he ex3cuted rival revolutionary leaders. He took an oath of allegiance to the United States and disbanded the Philippine Republic.

Republican Filipinos though continued to resist US rule into 1902 while a separate rebellion of Muslim Filipinos continued even longer. The Philippine conflict claimed the lives of 5,000 US troops, 20,000 Filipino revolutionaries and 250,000 Filipino civilians, many from disease and starvation. The SpanishAmerican W4r was short and one sided, but it had important consequences.

For Cubans, it meant a fragile independence, weakened by decades of US military interventions. For the Philippines, it meant nearly 50 years of American rule. The w4r also saw the end of the remnants of Spain’s once global empire. They even sold their remaining Pacific island possessions to Germany in 1899. Some Spanish intellectuals of the so called generation of 98 promoted liberal reforms for the country after the w4r, while many military officers turned to more conservative views as a result of the defeat.

The United States came out of the w4r much more confident on the world stage and it felt free to intervene in the Americas whenever it saw fit. Some even felt that the w4r brought the country closer together after the civil w4r and racial strife of the previous decades. Although these divisions persisted, America also had a new overseas empire, one that companies like Bethlehem Steel and the United Fruit Company would prove eager to profit from under the protection of the US military.

In the eyes of some, America had come of age. For others, it was the beginning of the American age of empire. The Philippines would play a crucial role in the Pacific W4r 40 years later. In 1941, the Japanese invaded and defeated the US forces there. And in 1944, US troops under Douglas MacArthur landed to liberate the Philippines again.

During their campaign, they launched multiple daring raids to free pr1soners of w4r. If you want to learn more about the raid of the Cabanatuan pr1son camp in early 1945, check out our new series, History’s Most Daring Raids. And where can you watch History’s Most Daring Raids? On Nebula, a streaming service we’re building with other creators, where you don’t need to sift through a deluge of AI slot.

Nebula is made and curated by humans and it’s available in 4K resolution on your browser, on your smartphone, smart TV or streaming box like Apple TV or Roku. And that’s not all. On Nebula, you can also watch all our regular videos adree and earlier than on YouTube. And all that for just $30 for an entire year if you go to nebula.

tv/theg greatatew. Nebula is also a great gift, by the way. Just go to gift.nebula.tv/thegatew4r TV/theg greatatew give an entire year to family and friends, even if they already have an account. Victory in the SpanishAmerican W4r made America a global empire, and it wetted the appetites of expansionists looking for new conquests in the Pacific.

By the late 19th century, the United States and the independent island kingdom of Hawaii had intense economic and diplomatic ties for decades. The US considered Hawaii to be in its sphere of interest and stated as early as the 1840s it would tolerate no other foreign power interfering there.

Most native Hawaiians wanted their kingdom to remain independent, but American and European communities on the islands, especially the influential business leaders, had other plans. Foreigners were only 10% of the population, but dominated Hawaii’s important sugar production. and their influence grew while that of Hawaii’s government weakened, partly because the native population declined due to disease.

Many of these businessmen and other foreigners on the islands favored annexation by the United States, which already enjoyed preferential trade agreements and tariffs. In 1887, the Honolulu Rifles, a paramilitary force made up of foreigners and led by Lauren Thirstston, forced the government of King Kalakawa to accept the so called bayonet constitution, which increased the foreigner’s control of the parliament and courts with a view to eventual annexation.

The king also agreed to lease Pearl Harbor to the US Navy. Natives like lawyer Joseph Poo Poi are outraged. The Americans have no respect for royalty, for they have no king. Therefore, they want to exercise the same power here as they do in their own country. They are doing it little by little, and it will not be long before Hawaii becomes an entire republic.

We who cherish our king ought not to allow this to be done. In 1891, the king d1ed and was succeeded by his sister, Queen Lily Wu Kalani. She was a Christian convert and married to a white American, but opposed foreign control. The native population petitioned her to reverse the bayonet constitution, which she tried to do, but the foreigners saw her as a thre4t.

In 1893, a small group of powerful American and European businessmen, calling themselves the Committee for Safety, launched a bl00dless coup with the help of US Minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens. Part of their motivation is to ensure annexation by the United States to avoid the sugar tariff Washington had imposed which damaged Hawaiian sugar exports.

They occupied the government building under the g.uns of the American w4rship USS Boston and US Marines who officially entered Honolulu to quote protect US lives and property. The insurgents then named themselves the provisional government and in 1894 declared a Hawaiian republic under Sanford Dole, a Hawaiian born American.

Native Hawaiians opposed the coup and the republic and rebelled under Robert Wilcox in a failed 3 day revolution in 1895, leading to the impr1sonment of the queen and rebel leaders. In 1897, President McKinley and the Republic of Hawaii signed a treaty agreeing to annexation.

The native population opposed the move and successfully petitioned the US Senate in Washington and the treaty was defeated. In 1898, though, the outbreak of the Spanishamean W4r brought more public support for territorial expansion, and pro anexation forces in Congress now argued that Hawaii would be an important military base in the Pacific for the w4r against Spain.

On July 7th, 1898, the United States and the Republic of Hawaii officially agreed to US annexation of Hawaii by joint resolution. President McKinley saw it as a fulfillment of destiny. The incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands into the body politic of the United States is the necessary and fitting sequel to the chain of events which from a very early period of our history has controlled the intercourse and prescribed the a.ssociation of the United States and the Hawaiian Islands.

Not only is the union of the Hawaiian territory to the United States no new scheme, but it is the inevitable consequence of the relation steadfastly maintained with that mid Pacific domain for 3/4 of a century. Annexation was enacted in August 1898 with Hawaii receiving official territorial status in 1900 and eventually statethood in 1959.

So, the SpanishAmerican W4r and the annexation of Hawaii est4blished the United States as a global player. This brought strategic and economic advantages and although some US politicians and citizens opposed expansion, many Americans were enthusiastic. The taste of empire is in the mouth of the people.

An imperial policy, the republic renent, taking her place with the armed nations. The US military soon put its new Asian military bases to use as American troops joined European and Russian forces in an intervention in China against the Boxer Rebellion to protect foreign commercial interests and influence in the country. Washington’s open door policy in China now gave US companies preferential access to the Chinese market.

In 1907, Roosevelt decided to show the world and especially an expansionist Japan the US Navy’s growing might. So he sent a fleet of 16 b4ttleships and 14,000 sailors on around the world cruise known as the Great White Fleet. The operation was a PR success, although the Americans did stru.ggle to supply the fleet given their lack of coing stations abroad.

A few of the ships even made an unplanned stopover in Sicily to provide humanitarian aid following an earthquake. The global cruise ended in February 1909, having lasted 14 months. The United States continued to expand its influence closer to home as well. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 declared that the US would oppose any new conquests by foreign powers in its sphere of interest, the Americas.

But a crisis in Venezuela led to a dr4matic change to the doctrine that would upend parts of Latin America for decades. In 1902, Venezuela was just coming out of decades of civil w4rs and revolts, which had caused its various governments to go deep into debt. The creditors were American and European who also demanded payment for their citizens property damage.

Venezuelan President Castro at first refused. So the navies of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany blockaded the country for 3 months. The US did not participate but also didn’t intervene and Washington was upset when an international arbitration court decision benefited the blockading countries and not the US. So, President Theodore Roosevelt decided to redefine the Monroe Doctrine by adding the Roosevelt corollery, which he explained in a message to Congress in 1904.

Chronic wrongdoing or an impetence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation. And in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

Roosevelt had given the US a much lower threshold to intervene in the Caribbean and Latin America, though simply buying territory was still an option, one that Washington tried to use to acquire Greenland. As early as 1868, the United States had offered to buy Greenland from Denmark, which had colonized the island’s southern coasts from the early 18th century.

The deal fell through, but from the 1880s to 1909, American explorer Robert Perry traveled to remote northern Greenland and claimed parts of it for the United States, although these claims had no international legal status. In 1910, the US offered to buy the island again and again the deal failed. During the First World W4r, the US also became concerned about a possible future German presence in the Caribbean to protect the Panama Canal.

Washington again approached Denmark. Back in 1902, the US had offered to buy the Danish West Indian Islands, a small archipelago in the Caribbean. Critical from the American point of view was that there was a deep water port that could be used for w4rships. In 1916, Denmark was ready to sell. So, US and Danish diplomats agreed to a sale for $25 million, and the islands became the US Virgin Islands from 1917.

The Danes, however, insisted on an addendum to the treaty, an extra agreement related to Greenland. Copenhagen requested that the US recognize its claim to all of Greenland. In an attached declaration, US Secretary of State Robert Lancing accepted on behalf of the US government. The government of the United States of America will not object to the Danish government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland.

It was a deliberate exception to the US Monroe Doctrine of not allowing any new claims by other powers in the Americas and de facto recognition of Danish sovereignty over all of Greenland, which Denmark formally declared in 1921. So, the US had bought the Virgin Islands and recognized Denmark’s claim to Greenland.

At the same time, Teddy Roosevelt’s expansion of the Monroe Doctrine and US business interests led to decades of intervention in Central America, often known as the Banana W4rs. Central America took on a new strategic importance in the late 19th century. One of the main reasons was the potential for a shipping canal that would link the Atlantic and the Pacific, not only for commerce, but also for w4rships.

The US had shown some interest as early as the 1850s, but the French were the first to actually start building one in 1881. They began digging through the narrow Panama Ismos, which was under the control of Colombia at the time. But by 1888, the French company went bankrupt at the canal just 40% complete.

In 1903, the US struck a deal to buy the a.ssets of the former French company for $40 million. The Colombian government, though, still needed to give its approval since it had conceded the right to dig to the French back in the 1880s. Colombia had just emerged from a bl00dy civil w4r and desperately needed money. So, some politicians wanted to wait until the original concession ran out in 1904, which would leave Colombia with the French a.ssets.

US President Theodore Roosevelt was outraged as he told his Secretary of State, “I do not think the Bogotaa Lord of Jack Grabbits should be allowed permanently to bar one of the future highways of civilization.” Luckily for Roosevelt, a solution was not long and coming. There were Panameanian separatists who wanted independence from Colombia, and they asked the US for a.ssistance.

They received a cryptic response through an intermediary to the effect that US w4rships could be on the Atlantic coast in 36 hours and on the Pacific in 48. The Panameanian separatists took the hint and announced independence on November 3rd, 1903. The USS Nashville moved in to prevent Colombian retaliation, which resulted in a near bl00dless revolution in Panama.

Roosevelt and the Panameanian government then struck an agreement which gave the US a 16 km wide zone to build the canal with quote all rights, power, and authority as if it were the sovereign of the territory. In exchange, Panama became a US protectorate. One historian described the turn of events as follows.

Panama became a rare recorded instance of a country that declared its independence and gave it up at the same time. Building the canal was a triumph of engineering. American engineers chose a challenging system of locks for the canal, which required years of work to complete, but proved more successful than the previous French attempts at a level canal.

The project required huge numbers of workers, most of whom were AfroCaribbean people, especially from Barbados. The work was backbreaking and d4ngerous, and the attitude of some white American overseers of the bl4ck workers was often poor. As more knowledge was gained as to the methods and habits of these negroes, the engineers became impressed with the belief that a part at least of their non efficiency arose from lack of proper nourishment.

In other words, that they were not getting proper food in sufficient and regular amounts to give them strength for continuous work. A major hurdle to construction was tropical diseases, especially malaria and yellow fever. These illnesses had decimated the workforce under the French. So the Americans put experienced sanitation engineer William Gorgas in charge.

He had workers drain much of the standing water in the canal zone to lower the mosquito population with success. Even so about 5,500 workers d1ed during construction. By 1914, the Panama Canal was complete and Roosevelt’s actions ushered in a new era of US involvement in Central America and the Caribbean. In time, the US adopted the so called dollar diplomacy to influence the region by financial control.

In the early 1900s, big business meant bananas. Bananas started out in the US as a novelty food. But by 1914, they were the second most popular fruit after apples. US companies imported up to 50 million bunches a year, which meant an increase in revenue from $250,000 in 1901 to $13 million in 1910. The fruit was especially popular amongst workingcla.ss Americans because it was cheap and could be easily brought to dirty work sites in its protective peel.

Banana excitement even spawned a hit song in 1923 called Yes, We Have No Bananas. It wasn’t long before companies got very interested in the banana business. In 1899, the Standard Steam Navigation Company and the Boston Fruit Company merged to create the United Fruit Company, which soon became a giant multinational. United Fruit was known for its aggress1ve business tactics, which included undercutting rivals and buying up huge swaths of land in Central America.

Eventually, the company owned over 3 million acres in Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Panama, Colombia, Cuba, and Jamaica. Up to a third of this land was jungle, but owning it prevented rival companies from expanding. On United Fruits plantations, company laws were gospel. It had its own security forces and spy network, and troublesome workers were unwelcome.

Some were even lynched. To keep cash within the company, United Fruit paid its workers in vouchers that could only be used in company stores. So by the early 1900s, United Fruit was expanding so fast it became known as the octopus. The company now wanted to get into the most lucrative banana producing country, Honduras.

And if you wanted to do business in Honduras, you needed to do business with Sam the Banana Man, Zamuri. Zamuri was a banana entrepreneur who was especially known for risky ventures in Honduras. United Fruit bought 60% of his company but was then forced to sell it back to him to comply with new antitrust laws.

Zamuri though was unable to afford his shares and so remained secretly in debt to United Fruit. In 1907, political events put United Fruit’s lucrative operations in Honduras at risk. General Manuel Bonia, dictator and friend of United Fruit, was overthrown by both the Honduran and Nicaraguan armies. In 1910, United Fruit offered to build railways in Honduras in exchange for land and concessions.

But the new president, Miguel Davila, refused. The exiled Bonia and Sam Zamuri, had other ideas, though. They hired a group of American mercenaries, including Lee Christmas and his partner, Guy Machine Gun Maloney, and bought an old US Navy vessel, the Hornet. The conspirators landed at Trujillo, joined with local supporters and f1ghters from Guatemala, who were most likely hired by United Fruit.

The coup was a success, and Bonia was quickly reinstated despite US attempts at mediation. The US had done little to stop the coup, and American w4rships had watched as Bonia arrived. Privately, President William How4rd Taft was irritated since the US was attempting to bring Honduras under its economic control through dollar diplomacy, but he didn’t want to get into a f1ght with United Fruit either.

The company denied all involvement, but did benefit greatly from Zamur’s coup. Zamuri received land and tax breaks from Bonia, which he then pa.ssed on to United Fruit to cover his debt. Free of the octopus, Zamuri would eventually become their biggest rival before taking over as president of United Fruit himself.

According to journalist Peter Chapman, the Honduran episode would mark a turning point for United Fruit. The events of 1911 in Honduras brought to an end what might be termed the United Fruit Company’s Nice Guy period. There would be little more of that. United Fruit had est4blished its power and was of every mind to wield it.

So, United Fruit had est4blished itself as a power in Central America, but it wasn’t the only one. The US government also didn’t hesitate to get involved. Nicaragua was one of the countries of interest to the US since for some time it was considered a potential location for a trans oceanianic canal.

American business interests, however, also loomed large, especially around the coastal town of Bluefields. In 1909, conservative rebels, including many Americans, overthrew President Jose Santos Zlaya. Zlaya had been accused of h0stility tow4rds US business interests, and he was forced to resign when US Marines landed to protect American citizens.

He was replaced by Juan Jose Estrada, who in turn was replaced by Adulo Diaz in 1911. Diaz was a big supporter of the US and had business interests in bluefields. But the closer he got to the US, the more enemies he made in Nicaragua. Minister of W4r General Luis Mena, with the support of the army, soon called for Diaz’s resignation.

The US intervened diplomatically to protect Diaz. So Mena cut off electricity in the capital, and his troops b0mbarded the city for 4 hours. Now that vi0lence had broken out in Nicaragua, the US once again sent in the Marines under Major Smemedley Butler, whose troops arrived in August 1912. Butler’s orders were not to go after the rebels, but to secure the main railway line and keep any f1ghting away from it.

In September, Butler commandeered a train and headed down the line tow4rds Granada. The rebels had sabotaged the lines with liquid from milkweed, which caused the train’s wheels to slip so much the Marines had to get out and push. Once the Americans finally arrived at Messiah, a rebel force of 150 horsemen then 4mbushed them. Butler ordered the train to drive straight through the @ttack.

It was a gorgeous spectacle. A sheet of fire was spitting into the darkness on both sides of the road. 400 marine rifles were popping with tongues of flame. The 16 machine g.uns were rattling out a staccato beat. The engines were screaming and puffing all in one little narrow street. Mena said the @ttack was a mistake, but politically the damage had been done.

Butler ordered Mena to resign, which he did, though some of his commanders decided to hold out. General Benjamin Zeldon, whose troops had originally @ttacked Butler, moved his 800 men into defensive positions on two fortified hills overlooking Messiah and dug in. On October 4th, around 1,000 Marines and sailors and 4,000 Diaz supporters surrounded the hills.

During the night, Marines crept up to the first hill and stormed it. Then they turned the captured artillery against the second hill. Within half an hour, the b4ttle was over with around 30 rebels and four marines k1lled. By October 6th, the Nicaraguan rebels had been defeated. Diaz’s presidency was secure and his government erected a memorial to the US forces.

We desire that our elder sister, the great republic of the United States, so wise, so powerful, will bring to us permanently the benefits which all her sons enjoy throughout all her vast and peaceful domain. The opposition Nicaraguan press was less enthusiastic and @ttacked Butler and his home state personally.

They described the US intervention as the blonde pigs of Pennsylvania advancing on our garden of beauty. The US would remain in Nicaragua until 1933 and was often accused of rigging the elections, a claim even Butler did not dispute. The Nicaraguan occupation of 1912 marked a turning point since it was the first time US forces had actively gone into b4ttle to suppress a revolution.

US interventions after Nicaragua were concentrated in the Caribbean, but in 1921, conflict and American troops once again returned to Central America. One of the reasons for the numerous conflicts between Central American states was border disputes. Many ran through poorly mapped jungle, which was a problem when even small pieces of land were hugely important to the small states.

A prime example of this kind of conflict was the Cotto W4r between Costa Rica and Panama in 1921. At the center of the conflict was the tiny disputed village of Cotto, which was home to 27 families. In 1914, the US confirmed a prior judgment which aw4rded the village to Costa Rica and ordered the Panameanians to withdraw even though Panama was a US protectorate.

This was politically impossible for Panameanian President Belisario Poras, who was under pressure not to give away any land. In December 1919, Costa Rican President Julio A Costa Garcia called on Panama to finally accept the decision. Although Costa Rica was militarily stronger than Panama, Poras delayed withdrawing in the hopes that the US would protect its protectorate.

The Costa Ricans then announced their intention to the US to occupy Cotto, but the Americans did not respond. A Costa a.ssumed the US was not interested and sent 28 sold1ers to Cotto who quickly overpowered the single police officer. There was an explosion of nationalist sentiment in Panama which put Poras under even more pressure.

Since Panama had no army, volunteers tried to create one, but there weren’t enough w3apons. Instead, the thousand men of the police force were converted into a makeshift Panameanian army. Poras tried to avoid a conflict and publicly said that w4r between Panama and Costa Rica over valless land was an absurdity.

In response, an angry mob stormed the Senate and Poras was saved by US forces. So, a tiny village had brought Panama and Costa Rica to the brink of w4r. Neither president truly wanted it, but domestic political pressure by nationalists demanded action. And so, in February 1921, the Cotto W4r began. The w4r started well for Panama despite its military weakness.

President Poras heard that the Costa Ricans were going to reinforce their troops in Cotto, so he sent General Manuel Quintterero with a scratch force of policeman turned sold1ers. When they arrived, the Costa Rican garrison withdrew without a f1ght. Quantero now laid plans to 4mbush any boats coming across the border by river.

On February 27th, his forces 4mbushed a Costa Rican boat and captured a machine g.un, which they used to capture another boat carrying 100 Costa Rican troops. But these were minor victories, and the Panameanians were still desperately short of w3apons and ammunition. The next clashes occurred along the Atlantic coast.

On March 4th, the Costa Ricans commandeered a United Fruit train and crossed the border on the Siola River. The Panameanians did not dare to blow up the bridge as it was also owned by United Fruit and so they simply retreated. President Aosta now ordered an advance deeper into Panama. Privately, he actually wanted to provoke US intervention to end a w4r that he didn’t want.

1,200 Costa Ricans armed with 17 machine g.uns and three cannons now prepared to land on the island of Bokeas del Toro. The US promptly sent w4rships to the area and forced a stop to the f1ghting on March 5th. Costa Rica had won the military conflict, but both sides actually benefited from the w4r politically.

Poras made a show of wanting to continue the f1ght to satisfy the Panameanian nationalists, knowing full well the US would not allow it. The presence of US forces also gave Aosta a convenient excuse to withdraw his army from Panama. In June, Panama sent diplomat Narciso Garay to Washington to plead their case.

They were disappointed by the lack of support from their protector and asked for the Cotto decision of 1914 to be reconsidered in their favor. The US refused, so Garay wrote a lengthy letter of protest. The acts carried out by the government of Costa Rica under the protection of the United States will be impotent to k1ll or weaken Panama’s right to continue to occupy Panameanian territory.

The Cotto judgment only proves that in the present state of the world, force still governs relations between the two countries and that the rights of the people are only valid in direct proportion to the rifles, machine g.uns, and cannon they have to back them up. Costa Rica finally occupied Cotto peacefully in September 1921.

The Cotto W4r and the other conflicts in the Banana W4rs period had a major impact on the states and people of Central America. US interventions would cause longlasting political, economic, and social issues. But were the banana w4rs really about bananas? The answer is a bit complicated. United Fruit and other companies certainly played a role and contemporaries often a.ssumed they had a hand in US interventions.

One observer wrote of the Cotto W4r, “The United States intervened whether in compliance with her protective treaty obligations tow4rds Panama or to protect the United Fruit Company’s extensive plantations near Bokeas. It is not possible to say. In fact, the US government and United Fruit were often at odds in Central America.

US senators from both parties tried to introduce taxes and antitrust laws to limit United Fruits growth. While the company’s deals with local governments interfered with Washington’s dollar diplomacy, some  historians have argued that US financial domination in Central America was not just about money, but about keeping other powers out of the region in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine.

According to this argument, many Central American states owed money to European powers who might intervene in case of political inst4bility or collapse. US agy could therefore be preserved via economic control. But for two time Medal of Honor recipient and Banana W4rs veteran Smemedley Butler, the w4rs were about money.

Butler became disillusioned with the US role in the region and went on a speaking tour. He later summed up his feelings. I spent 33 years being a highcla.ss muscleman for big business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909 1912.

I helped make Mexico and especially Tempico safe for American oil interests in 1916. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests. In 1916, I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank Boys to collect revenue in. I helped in the rape of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street.

In 1921, though, these deb4tes were a long way off for Butler and for the people of Central America. Butler and the Marines would return to Nicaragua in 1929 to put down another revolution. and US interventions in the region continued for years to come. And for the United Fruit Company, business was still b00ming.

So by the early 1930s, the US had a legacy of multiple long term interventions in Central America, sometimes with military occupation and in other cases as an indirect imperial policy. And as Butler wrote, US involvement in the Caribbean followed a similar pattern. Some US politicians thought the country should just annex Cuba, but President William McKinley refused.

Instead, he created a provisional government under an American military governor that was supposed to introduce social, political, and economic reforms to modernize the island. Congress also pa.ssed the Platt amendment, which allowed the US to intervene in Cuba in the future and gave the US Navy use of the territory at Guantanamo Bay.

But for Governor Leonard Wood, progress was still too slow. Cubans had enjoyed a three hour workday under Spanish rule, and Wood claimed that their experience as a Spanish colony made it difficult for Cubans to adopt what he saw as productive American habits. The great ma.ss of public opinion is perfectly inert. Especially, this is true among the professional cla.sses.

The pa.ssive inactivity of 150 years has settled over them, and it is hard to get them out of old ruts and old grooves. We’re much hampered by the lack of practical experience on the part of the really influential men, and much tact has to be used to steer and divert them without offending or causing pain. However, by 1902, the Americans decided that conditions were st4ble enough for US troops to withdraw and leave Cuba in local hands.

But just four years later, in 1906, Cuba’s two main political parties, the Moderates and the Liberals, were clashing in pre election vi0lence. Cuban President and moderate leader Tamas Estrada Palma was accused of using security forces to ensure his re election. The liberals who were no friends of American involvement in the country in general now called for the US to ensure free elections.

President Theodore Roosevelt chose not to intervene and the situation in Cuba degenerated. The Liberals began to raise an army and by September they had 24,000 men under arms. They controlled the railways and were now thre4tening the capital. The moderate government only had about 3,000 police.

So this time the moderate party called on the US to come to Cuba. Roosevelt still didn’t send troops and instead called on President Estrada Palma to resign, which he refused to do while the Liberals were still armed. Meanwhile, the Liberals rejected the idea of disarming unless they had US protection. So in September, 2,000 Marines were once again sent to the island with instructions to accept the Cuban president’s resignation and again form a new provisional government.

Fresh elections were held in 1908 and have been described by one historian as quote the fairest in Cuban history. The liberal candidate got the most votes. So with orders seemingly restored, the US once again withdrew its forces in 1909. But some observers were worried about what might come next.

US administrator and army officer Robert Bullard made a pessimistic prediction. The US will have to go back. It is only a matter of time. Bullard turned out to be right and American Marines returned to Cuba in 1912 to stop further vi0lence. So, the US had fought a w4r in Cuba in 1898 and intervened numerous times in the years that followed.

But with America’s growing influence and the outbreak of the Great W4r in Europe in 1914, Cuba wasn’t the only Caribbean island where the US was getting involved. The completion of the Panama Canal in August 1914 and its importance to US interests presented a new strategic problem in the Caribbean. The Americans already controlled Cuba and Puerto Rico, but the island of Hispanola presented a potential weak point in US defenses of the eastern approaches to the canal.

This sensitive point became even more of a problem for the US when Americans accused Haiti of getting too close to German influence. Haiti covered half of Hispanola and had won its independence from France back in 1804. The country’s leaders had been unreceptive to US diplomatic advances and sometimes dealt with German businessmen who’d married into the local Haitian elite.

By 1914, US authorities considered Haiti to be aligned with Germany, and they would not tolerate a foreign power’s influence in the region or the lost opportunities for American companies. They also felt that given the population’s African origins, Haitians would not be able to govern themselves. In the view of the Haitian government, they were simply acting as would any sovereign nation.

The US began to make plans for an intervention, but events soon overtook them. Haiti had long stru.ggled with political inst4bility, and since 1911, seven presidents had been a.ssa.ssinated or deposed. From the American point of view, it was this type of cha0s that was making it possible for German influence to grow.

Inside Haitian society though the situation was more complicated. The island was ruled by a privileged French speaking elite that considered itself apart from the poorer Creole speaking majority. The vi0lence that often broke out in Haiti usually involved armed groups known as kacos. To some observers, the kacos were revolutionaries for hire who periodically captured poor prince for the highest bidder before returning home to their villages.

But to others, including many Haitians, they were the expression of the population’s desire to resist unscrupulous leaders. And soon enough, foreign occupation. In July 1915, a new round of political vi0lence came to a head. Just a few months earlier, President Vom had ordered the ex3cution of 167 opponents of his regime.

When the sentence was carried out, the population rose up against him under the leadership of Dr. Rosalvo Bobo. Bobo was an intellectual who had supported popular uprisings against previous Haitian rulers and opposed Sam’s closer relations with the United States. During the July uprising against Sam’s ex3cutions, Sam was dr4gged from the French emba.ssy where he’d been hiding and was k1lled by an angry crowd.

When news of the a.ssa.ssination got out, US Rear Admiral William Kaepern was in command of a nearby US Navy cruiser squadron. Without waiting for orders, he landed five companies of marines and sailors and made for Poro Prince. Resistance was light and US troops were soon in control of the city. Even though this was in violation of international law, Kaepern said that he acted to protect foreign lives and property and to est4blish order and maintain Hades constitution.

President Woodro Wilson approved the occupation and in the following months, Kapton appointed Philip Sudra Dartigan as president of Haiti. He also forced through a treaty that made Haiti into a virtual colony of the United States. The treaty gave the US control of Haitian finances, trade, diplomacy, and even gave the US the right to occupy the country for 10 to 20 years.

Some of the French speaking elite in the country was supportive of Kapton, but most of the poor Creole speaking population was not and wanted Dr. Bobo in power and the Americans out. Haitian journalist Eli Geran wrote of his hopes for the future of the country. The Monroe Doctrine, the Yankee imperialists mask, no doubt will deteriorate before long.

We Haitians must strive with courage to still suffer physically more and more, that is to say, until the end of the European W4r. In that case, we ought to be patient, calm, and proud while at the same time enduring suffering. As the hour for our liberation is the coming collapse of the Monroe Doctrine, relations between US troops and the local population were predictably tense and were made worse by the racial attitudes of most of the Americans.

It didn’t take long before the Kakos began a simmering guerilla w4r against the occupying forces under Charlemagne Peralt and Benoa Batrail. In fall 1915, the Marines began to patrol more aggress1vely outside of the capital and in a single November raid k1lled 50 Haitians in 10 minutes at Farier. The Marines had stormed the fort with the help of machine g.uns while the rebels had been armed with rifles, sticks, and stones.

No US sold1ers were k1lled in the @ttack. These types of marine patrols continued, and by January 1916, Admiral Kaepern reported optimistically about the military and the financial situation. All Haiti quiet. Military control of situation and status quo being maintained. Naval pay masters under paymaster conard continue in charge of the customs service and fiscal matters.

Practically entire Haitian financial system is now being so administered. And so with US troops in control of Haiti and a US friendly president installed, American authorities turned their attention to the Dominican Republic, Hades neighbor and the other state on the island of Hispanola. After gaining independence from Haiti and then Spain in the mid 19th century, the Dominican Republic had developed into a decentralized state where many of its people identified more with their home region than the new nation.

This made the country more susceptible to foreign influence, including from the United States. From 1900 onw4rds, the US took control of vital Dominican industries, including plantations and mining. This control intensified under President Wilson, who also sought moral leadership over what he considered quote univilized peoples.

Like Haiti, the Dominican Republic suffered from internal turmoil. In 1916, American friendly President Juan Isedro Himenez was at the head of a provisional government, but his real power was limited to the capital and areas outside Sto. Domingo were dominated by regional strongmen. In May 1916, the Minister for W4r, General Didio Arias, led a coup against the president.

Jimenez fled the country and reluctantly accepted US offers for intervention. The US thre4tened to b0mbard Sto. Domingo. So Aras fled to his regional stronghold of Cibauo. Further vi0lence seemed inevitable. So Himenez resigned as he explained to the US authorities. I cannot keep my word with you. I can never consent to @ttacking my own people.

Despite his protests, in June, the US sent in the Marines anyway. At Puerto Plata, around 500 Dominican f1ghters resisted an amphibious a.ssault of 130 Marines. Once ashore, marine machine g.uns and supporting naval fire quickly defeated the defenders. Meanwhile, more Marines landed at Monte Christi. After taking the town without resistance, they were @ttacked by local militia men on the outskirts.

According to Marine Commander Captain Frederick Weise, around 150 f1ghters charged down the hills directly at his machine g.uns. He concluded they had never seen such w3apons before. They dropped all up and down the line. I could see sheer amazement on their faces. Wise’s men then advanced along the Yak del Norte River with instructions to meet the Marines who’d landed at Puo Plata outside Arias’s capital of Santiago.

When the Marines arrived, Aras had already departed and most of his forces melted back into the population. The city was taken on July 6th without a f1ght. So with Aras defeated, US control of the Dominican Republic seemed secure. However, back in Santa Domingo, the US was unable to find a pro American presidential candidate.

Instead, in November 1916, they took full and direct control of the country and installed a US military government under Captain Henry Kap. Unlike in Haiti, there would be no pretense of an independent government. So, by 1916, the US had taken control of Haiti and installed a puppet government. and the US military was running the Dominican Republic.

But these were not the end of American interventions in the region. And soon the Marines would be sent to familiar places once again. By mid 1917, the level of political vi0lence in Cuba had decreased, even though there were still some areas where it persisted. American businessmen in Cuba were particularly worried about the safety of their sugar plantations.

In previous stru.ggles, these plantations had often been burned or abandoned. And so, in August, 1,000 Marines were sent in to protect them. This operation was disguised as a training exercise to avoid trouble with Cubans who opposed American influence in the country. By 1921, major political inst4bility had returned to Cuba, which resulted in yet another US intervention.

This time there were claims of electoral fraud concerning the election of moderate candidate Alfredo Zas. When new elections were held under Marine Guard in March 1921, Zas once again won. Now desperate for capital, he called on US banks to fund his government. JP Morgan Jr. agreed to the tune of $50 million, but only if ZAS introduced wide and sweeping political and economic reforms, including cutting the government budget in half.

Zas agreed, but anti American reaction made his position look vulnerable. Instead, once SAS got a hold of the money, he embarked on an extensive spending program and fired many of his American supported ministers and became increasingly resistant to following US orders. Meanwhile, Haiti was still an American satellite state. In 1918, the US backed government forced through a new constitution that allowed foreigners to own property, which had previously been forbidden.

Although voters in a subsequent plebite overwhelmingly supported the new constitution, only 5% of the population had actually voted. US authorities in Haiti also had started some infrastructure modernization programs such as rail and road construction. To do this, they revived a French colonial labor system known as the corve.

On paper, this gave Haitians the choice of providing unpaid labor or paying a special tax. Since the vast majority couldn’t afford the tax, they had no choice but to work. And this seemed like a return to slavery in the eyes of many. The policy was scrapped in late 1918, but it left lasting resentment.

In 1919, Kako leader Shaolaman Peralt launched a renewed revolt against the Haitian government and their American sponsors. His call to arms revived memories of Hades own stru.ggle for self liberation. Haitians, a day like the 1st of January, 1804 will soon rise. For 4 years, the occupation insults us in every way.

Every morning brings us a new sadness. No fear. We have arms. Let us drive out that ravenous people whose ravenousness is represented in the person of their president Wilson. Traitor, vagabond, rioter, thief. You will d1e with your country. Peralt rallied about 5,000 f1ghters and @ttacked Poro Prince France, but he failed to take it.

On November 1st, 1919, two US Marines disguised themselves as Kakos and snuck into his camp and sh0t him de@d. They took a photo of Peralt str.i.pped naked and tied to a door which was distributed to send a message to his supporters. But instead, it drew comparisons to the crucifixion of Christ and turned Peralt into a martyr.

Overall, the period of the Banana W4rs saw the US Marine Corps and the Navy generally taking on a central role in US geopolitics. These so called small w4rs would challenge the infrastructure and the abilities of the Marines as well as create a controversial legacy. On the ground, few forces could rival the training and the firepower of the Marines, but many of the US troops were also unprepared for the nature of the f1ghting in the tropics.

In addition, for a mission ccentric organization like the Marines, the lack of clear policy and orders in these banana w4rs proved frustrating. Colonel George C. Thorp, a veteran of the Dominican occupation, wrote in 1919, “It would seem that it would be a fine thing if the troops in the Dominican Republic and Haiti were told exactly what their mission is.

Uncertainty is always unsatisfactory. Men can face a very bl4ck future if they but know what it is. But an uncertain future, even with bright possibilities, is annoying and unsettling.” These issues were compounded by the inherent racism prevalent in the Marine Corps. The US Navy even prioritized sending commanders from the southern states because they thought that they would be better at dealing with people of African origin.

These attitudes meant that the Americans often did not recognize and did not understand the political and social dynamics of different Caribbean populations. Instead, local people were usually lumped together based exclusively on race. American attitudes cost the US politically, but they also cost local people’s lives.

Since a bl4ck resident’s life was not considered as valuable as a white Americans in the Dominican Republic, Dominicans were beaten and fined for criticizing the military occupation. Charles Merkel, a marine officer known as the Tiger of Sabo, gained a particular reputation for torture and for burning villages. He was eventually arr.ested but committed su1cide rather than stand trial.

After the United States entered the Great W4r in 1917, some Marine officers were transferred to Europe. The ones who weren’t often grew frustrated at missing out on the w4r in Europe since the Caribbean was considered a second rate posting. One marine officer wrote to his commander, “If I do a good job of clearing these provinces of insurgents and k1ll a lot, it ought to demonstrate I’d be a good German k1ller.

” These frustrations were sometimes taken out on the locals and the small but influential German population. By 1920, stories of abuse began to emerge despite the press censorship in the Dominican Republic. To an American public back home who saw themselves as rescuers, the accusations caused the scandal.

Historian Jeannie Johnson summed up the controversy. Marines alone cannot be saddled with the bl4me for bringing racism with them. They did this by virtue of their American heritage. But they must own the belligerent actions they vindicated through this perceptual lens. Actions that fell enough outside the American norm, r4icst as it was, that it was rejected by the Marines own domestic public and brought shame and indignation down on their service.

So despite being overshadowed by the larger conflicts of the period, the Banana W4rs would leave legacies that shaped the region for decades. In the Dominican Republic, the occupation lasted 8 years, while in Haiti, it continued for nearly 20. Economics undoubtedly played a large role in the banana w4rs, and the US frequently sought financial domination.

But even though money was important, it was not necessarily the end goal for American policymakers. Financial control instead served to underpin geopolitical goals and was seen as necessary for future democracy. However, the frequent thre4t and use of American military might to push through unpopular treaties and constitutions also fundamentally damaged the reputation of democracy in the region.

To many, the supposedly democratic governments were merely American puppets, and that was a claim that was difficult to refute. In some cases, the US presence did result in limited modernization, especially in Cuba, but this was usually limited to the capital cities. The US did create central security forces such as the rural guard in Cuba, the Jean Marie in Haiti, and the Guadia National in the Dominican Republic.

These forces did help to end the cycle of political coups that plagued the countries, but they also allowed power to be increasingly centralized. and centralized power would cast a long shadow on the history of the Caribbean in the decades to come. So, American presence in the Caribbean in the first three decades of the 20th century cemented its role as hegeimon in the region.

And although the US never fully controlled or occupied Mexico, the US did intervene in its southern neighbors long revolution and civil w4r as well. US policy in Mexico during the revolution had been inconsistent and the Americans had supported various factions at different times and even sold w3apons to Panchchobia.

Now that Beia had been defeated, Wilson wanted st4bility, trade, and access to Mexican oil fields. So, he recognized Karanza’s government. Beia was outraged. When he heard of the US decision, he stated, “I emphatically declare that there is much I have to thank Mr. Wilson for because he relieves me from the obligation of giving guarantees to foreigners and especially to those who had at one time been free citizens and are today va.ssels of an evangelical professor of philosophy.

I take no responsibility for future events. Some observers have argued that after his defeat at Aguas Calientes, Beia began to behave more recklessly and his men certainly did so. In January 1916, Beista stopped a train carrying 17 American engineers in Chihuahua and ex3cuted them. Beia denied he’d given the order for the k1llings, but this is deb4ted.

In February, Beia led 140 f1ghters on a two week expedition across the US border, arriving at Columbus, New Mexico on March 8th. His forces @ttacked, but accidentally sh0t into a horse st4ble they’d mistaken for a barracks and k1lled many of the horses that they’d planned to steal. Nearly 300 men of the US cavalry were based in the town and returned fire, but Beia’s men managed to raid the town center before they were beaten back.

This was the first invasion of US soil since 1812 and left 17 Americans and up to 100 beistas de@d. Now, there’s a lively deb4te about why Beia launched the raid on Columbus. Some have said it was to avenge Wilson’s recognition of Karanza. others that it was a vendetta against an arms dealer who lived in the town.

And still others theorized that Beia wanted to trigger a Mexican American w4r in which Mexicans would unite around his anti imperialist leadership. Wh@tever Beia’s reasons, the raid put pressure on Wilson to retaliate, but he didn’t want to risk full scale w4r with Mexico. So Wilson ordered a crossber punitive expedition led by General Jack Persing and supported by the first Arrow Squadron.

The goal of the 10,000man expedition was to capture Beia de@d or alive. And at first it even had clandestine logistical help from Karanza. Turns out the expedition was poorly planned and supplied, did not know the terrain, and did not get the support of the local population. They did defeat and wound Beia at Guerrero on March 29th, but he managed to escape.

Persing’s force marched more than 500 km into Mexico, but could not corner the elusive peasant f1ghters like the ones at a skirmish near Tommoik. A heavy fuselade was received from the circular hills to the east. This was the main body of the bandits. The bandits were not concentrated in any particular place, but were scattered along the crest and side of the mountains.

They had a decided advantage in position and there was no possible way of getting around them in the short time left before dark. Immediately the heavy firing began and the troops encountered considerable fire from the hills to the east but found only individual bandits or very small detachments to fire upon. As time pa.ssed, Beia’s reputation amongst the peasants grew even more.

Many US troops grew bored and frustrated in their camps and turned to gambling or local prostitutes, both of which were tolerated by the army. And the longer the Americans were in Mexico, the more tensions there were between them and Karanza. By June, he ordered Persing to lead the country and small cale skirmishes broke out between US troops and Mexican constitutionalist forces.

Eventually, the American expedition returned home in January 1917 without achieving its goal. Wilson’s desire to end the expedition received a boost from the Timan telegram in which Germany had proposed an alliance with Mexico against the US. The Germans hoped that if Mexico @ttacked the US, the Americans would be less able to supply Germany’s enemies in the Great W4r, France and Britain, with arms and supplies, as they had been doing since 1914.

This was the culmination of years of German involvement in Mexico. Back in 1915, German agents had proposed to support ex president Huerta with w3apons and cash if he declared w4r on the US in the case that he returned to power, a plot the US was aw4re of. In the end, Mexico remained neutral in the Great W4r.

After the First World W4r ended, the United States had the possibility of further extending its international presence to Europe and the Middle East. US forces temporarily participated in the occupation of the Rhineland after the armistice and provided humanitarian aid in Europe and the Middle East. But Washington refused to act as a mandatory power to protect and administer a proposed independent Armenia.

The 1920s saw US disengagement from Europe, but its policy in the Caribbean and Latin America only changed in 1934. President Franklin Roosevelt’s good neighbor policy reduced US interventions in the region, and most direct occupation forces went home. By then, more than three decades of imperial expansion and intervention left the United States with an imperial reach from East Asia to the Caribbean and a legacy of tension and conflict with Latin America.

Despite the new commitment, the decades to come would see familiar and new forms of American intervention among its neighbors. We want to thank Sophi Suda for her help with this episode. As usual, you can find all the sources for this video in the descr.i.ption below. If you’re watching this video on Nebula or Patreon, thank you so much for the support. We couldn’t do it without you.

I’m Jesse Alexander, and this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel that thinks that if you offer to buy something from the owner multiple times and they refuse, it’s not for sale, and you shouldn’t steal it.