Why the Allies Lost the Battle of Gallipoli 1915
In early 1915, the Western Front was bogged down in a trench stalemate. Some British leaders, like First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, looked to other fronts for easier opportunities. Striking at the Ottoman Empire, Germany’s weakest ally, might gain Britain a quick and decisive victory.
The Ottomans controlled the vital Turkish Straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, which connected the Mediterranean and Black Seas. If the British could take the Straits and thre4ten Constantinople, they might knock the Ottomans out of the w4r and open a new supply line for the hard pressed Russians, who asked Britain for help in January 1915. A British victory might also favourably influence neutral Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece – and gain prestige for the Royal Navy given the w4r’s focus was on land.
Churchill had visions of historic proportions: “Think what Constantinople is to the East. It is more than London, Paris and Berlin all rolled into one are to the West. Think how it has dominated the East. Think what its fall will mean.” (Hart The Great W4r 167) We want to thank BlackMill Games and their upcoming Gallipoli game for sponsoring this documentary and providing some of their detailed in game models.
To learn more about Gallipoli, the new entry in the WW1 Game Series, check out the links in the descr.i.ption below. Taking the Straits though, would not be easy. The Gallipoli Peninsula protected the waterway, and its terrain was very rugged, split by hills and steep ravines – a problem already highlighted by British and Greek planners in the past.
Nearly all British ground forces though were on the Western Front, so Churchill pushed for a risky naval only @ttack. British and French w4rships would destr0y the Ottomans’ coastal forts and g.uns as they steamed 60km to the Sea of Marmara. Once they got there, they could force Constantinople to surrender. Initially, not everyone shared Churchill’s optimism.
W4r Minister Lord Kitchener was lukew4rm, and naval officers, including First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher, argued w4rships would be too vulnerable in the narrow waterway. Churchill though, won over some doubters and the W4r Council approved. The Russians even promised to help from the Black Sea, though this never materialized. Meanwhile, the Ottomans expected a possible British @ttack.
The coastal forts and g.uns were part of the Fortified Command Area under Brigad1er Cevat Pasha, and 500 German troops arrived to train and advise. Some of the forts along the straits were outdated, but others had modern German g.uns. They also had 230 mobile g.uns and howitzers concealed inland, meant to pierce w4rships’ fragile decks.
The Ottomans also laid mines, spread anti submarine nets, installed torpedo tubes, and positioned the German built w4rship Yavuz at the narrows. On February 19, 67 Allied w4rships arrived at the Dardanelles, including 16 mostly older b4ttleships. They sh3lled Ottoman positions several times, but the ships’ g.uns were meant to fire on a flat trajectory and couldn’t reach the Ottomans’ inland howitzers.
New Allied naval commander Rear Admiral John De Robeck led an all out @ttack on March 18, and three lines of British and French ships exchanged heavy fire with the Ottoman g.uns. At one fort, Ottoman Corporal Seyit loaded a heavy sh3ll on his own after his g.un’s loading mechanism was damaged – and later became a national hero in Turkey.
Unbeknownst to the Allies, Ottoman minelayer Nusret had recently laid new mines, and several ships ran into them or were hit by sh3lls. Ottoman officer Ashir Arkayan watched as French b4ttleship Bouvet went down with 640 hands: “The Bouvet started to withdraw, but at that moment a cloud of red and bl4ck smoke arose from under the ship, which may have struck a mine.
Immediately after this there was a much more vi0lent explosion. We believed that a sh3ll from had blown up the magazine. The ship heeled over at once and her crew poured into the sea.” (Hart Gallipoli 38) Soon, two more ships sank , several others were damaged, and the fleet withdrew. The big ships had failed because they couldn’t hit the enemy, Ottoman howitzers were effective, and Allied minesweepers couldn’t clear mines due to Ottoman artillery.
Some have argued that if had tried again the next day as planned, the ships could have made it. But this is unlikely, since the Ottomans still had plenty of ammunition and 400 more sea mines in the water. The Allied naval @ttack had failed thanks to Ottoman resistance and British underestimation of the enemy.
Now, British commanders decided to land troops on the Gallipoli peninsula to take the Dardanelles forts from behind. In mid March, British General Ian Hamilton arrived to command the 50,000 strong Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, or MEF. The MEF included British and Indian units as well as the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps, or ANZAC, and was joined by 18,000 French troops.
The main landing would be by British units at Cape Helles in the south, to capture the height of Achi Baba and move on the forts. Meanwhile the Anzacs would land further north to thre4ten Ottoman logistics. To distract the Ottomans, the Royal Naval Division would thre4ten a landing at Bulair, and the French would temporarily land on the Asian side. Some French thought the plan would fail, as did the Sultan of Egypt.
On the Ottoman side, German General Liman von Sanders took command in late March. He modified the Ottoman forw4rd defense plan, placing reserves inland to counter@ttack after landings. His 5th Army was mostly Turkish, but included several Syrian Arab regiments. Brigad1er General Esat Pasha’s III Corps would be responsible for defending the Canakkale Fortified Zone, and many of his troops were experienced from the recent Balkan W4rs.
On April 25, 1915, 200 Allied ships steamed from nearby Lemnos. The Anzacs landed first, but in the pre dawn darkness, the small steam pinnaces towing their rowboats from the b4ttleship lose their way and they landed off target at Ari Burnu – also known as Anzac Cove. Australian officer Stanley Weir was surprised to meet resistance: “We thought our landing was to be effected quite unopposed, but when our boats were within about 30 yards of the beach heavy rifle and machine g.un fire was opened upon us, we had to row for another 15 yards or so before we reached water shallow
enough to get out of the boats.” (Macleod 30) The few Ottoman defenders, equally sh0cked, scrambled to respond: “I was still asleep [when] the sentry started shouting, ‘There’s something unusual. Get up!’ Then the company commander ordered us all to move up into the trenches.
we saw there were lots of them pouring out of their boats. We opened fire and they dropped down on the beach with the g.uns in their hands.” (Macleod 31) The terrain beyond the beach was difficult, made up of steep gullies that made command and control, and orientation difficult for the inexperienced Anzacs and their officers. Anzac commander General William Birdwood decided to secure some of the high ground but left the highest part of the Sari Bair Ridge to his north for later.
The Ottomans sprang into action, with Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal leading reinforcements onto the ridge and @ttacking the Anzacs’ vulnerable northern flank. Fighting raged with hilltops changing hands – the Anzacs outnumbered the Ottomans two to one, but the Ottomans were better organized and had good artillery support. Ottoman officers were more experienced and more decisive – especially Kemal, who issued a dr4matic message: “I do not a.ssume that any one of us would not rather d1e than repeat the shameful history of the Balkan W4r. Should we however have any such men among us, we will immediately arr.est them
and put them up for ex3cution.” (Leonhard 269) In his later memoirs, Kemal likely embellished his now famous “I do not expect you to @ttack, I order you to d1e” command of the same day. In any case the Ottomans prevented the Anzacs from taking the ridge, and the Australians and New Zealanders dig in. Some Anzac officers feared they’d be overrun the next day, but the line held.
Meanwhile, as part of the diversions, the Royal Naval Division waited on ships in the Gulf of Saros but, as planned, never disembarked. The French diversionary force landed near the Kum Kale fort, and fought a bitter overnight b4ttle: “The Senegalese scaled the fort’s parapet, led by Lieutenant Bonavista, who was k1lled.
Captain Brison was sh0t through the arm, but refused to be treated and continued to command his company, which captured the fort with heavy losses.” (Feirrera 48) [W4r Diary of the Corps expéditionnaire d’orient] The French and African troops then withstood several Ottoman counter@ttacks with the support of naval g.unfire, before withdrawing as intended the next day.
For the main @ttack at Cape Helles, British troops landed at five beaches. They take two lightly defended beaches easily, but command and control confusion causes troops at one beach to dig in prematurely and evacuate the next morning. Fighting is intense at the two main beaches even though the British far outnumber the Ottomans.
Ottoman sold1er Abdul Rahman begged his commander for help: “ with the 20 or 25 men I have with me, it will not be possible to drive [the British] off with a bayonet charge I can see it is absolutely certain that they will land more men tonight. Alas, alas, my Captain! For the sake of Allah send me reinforcements because hundreds of sold1ers are landing! Hurry! What on earth will happen, my Captain?” (Broadbent, 84) At W Beach, the second British wave breaks through the Ottoman defenses after tough f1ghting at the foot of the cliffs – six men
from the Lancashire Fusiliers later received the Victoria Cross for actions that morning. At V Beach British troops on the steamer River Clyde stru.ggle to get ashore, the naval g.unfire isn’t effective, and the Ottomans rain de@dly fire on the landing boats. Captain David French of the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers ran the gauntlet: “ the water around seemed to be alive, the bull3ts striking the sea all around us.
thought I had got through safely when they put [a bull3t] through my arm. The fellows in the regiment told me I was getting too fat to run, but those who saw me go through that bit of water changed their opinions later – I ran like h3ll!” (Hart The Great W4r 173) [David French] The V beach landing seemed in danger, but British success at neighboring beaches allowed them to secure it, partly thanks to dr4matic bayonet charges by Irish troops to capture a key hill.
Still, but the en d of the day, the highest point overlooking the coastal forts, Achi Baba, was still in Ottoman hands. So the MEF had pulled off a successful, opposed amphibious landing – a first in modern w4rfare. But the greatly outnumbered Ottomans had stopped the Allies close to the beaches. Some have argued this was a vindication of Von Sanders’ new defensive scheme, while others say the original Ottoman defence plan would have worked even better. Both sides now brought in reinforcements and went over to the @ttack.
Within days, the Royal Naval Division and French contingent joined the line at Cape Helles after their diversions on April 25. The Allies tried to break the stalemate by taking the town of Krithia and moving on Achi Baba – they @ttacked in late April, in May, and again in early June.
But they could not break the Ottoman lines in any of the three Battles of Krithia. A French report documented the futility: “As soon as the offensive began a strong and well deployed enemy offered energetic resistance our line was pinned down 200m from strong trenches covered by machine g.uns. It’s impossible to get up the Kereves Dere [spur].” (Feirrera 53) Hamilton’s b4ttle plans were too complex and the British lacked artillery, so their greatest advance was just 900m.
The Ottomans counter@ttacked several times, but suffered very heavy losses for no gain. Neither side could break the stalemate at Cape Helles. Meanwhile, at Anzac Cove, the Ottomans launched their biggest counter@ttack so far. On the night of May 18, they stormed the Anzac trenches – but they lacked artillery support, and British aircraft had detected preparations beforehand so the Anzacs knew they were coming.
In about 12 hours, the Ottomans lost 10,000 de@d and wounded to just 600 Anzacs – Von Sanders later admitted the @ttack was a mistake. The two sides agreed to a truce to bury the piles of de@d, and Australian Compton Mackenzie helped with the grisly work: “Looking down I saw squelching up from the ground on either side of my boot like a rotten mangold the deliquescent green and bl4ck flesh of a Turk’s head.
nothing would cleanse the smell of de4th from the nostrils for a fortnight afterw4rds.” (Macleod 2) The ma.ssacre caused some Anzacs to feel renewed empathy or respect for the other side. An Ottoman officer reflected: “At this spectacle even the most gentle must feel s4vage and the most s4vage must weep.” (Macleod 2) So by early summer, there was no end in sight to the trench stalemate on Gallipoli.
And even when the troops weren’t f1ghting, the peninsula was a h3llish place to be. As the Allies and Ottomans traded blows on Gallipoli, the men on both sides suffered terribly from the peninsula’s uniquely bad conditions. The Allies’ beachheads were so small, that there was hardly any rear area to speak of – which meant that everything was in range of enemy g.uns all the time.
The rugged terrain also meant that digging latrines was more difficult, as was evacuating casualties. British sold1er John Simpson Kirkpatrick later became famous for using a donkey to transport the wounded down the steep ravines at Anzac Cove. He was k1lled May 19. The buildup of rotting bod1es led to a plague of flies that tormented the men, and diseases like typhus and dysentery ravaged Allied ranks.
Disease incapacitated more Allied sold1ers than combat, a problem made worse by the constant and severe shortage of water. A lack of beds on hospital ships or on Lemnos also meant that, especially early in the campaign, the British and French stru.ggled to treat casualties in time. This all had an effect on morale, which began to fall from July.
Ottoman troops also suffered from the heat and stench – but their deep hinterland and shorter overland supply lines meant they had enough food and water, and enough hospital beds for the wounded – and they suffered very little from disease. Even though there was a pause in major offensives, smaller scale f1ghting continued and both sides adapted.
Allied forces converted jam tins into hand grenades, which they sometimes used as booby traps. Snipers and sharpshooters who were especially sk1lled with the Mauser or Lee Enfield rifle became a fixture – Australian William Beech even developed a periscope rifle to fire from safety. Although the Ottomans didn’t have telescopic sights, they had the advantage of the high ground. British officer A.P.
Herbert complained: “We lost twelve men each day as they stood up from their cooking or carelessly raised their heads and in the night there were sudden screams where a sentry had moved his head too often against the moon.” (Pegler 106) [A.P. Herbert] Australian sniper Billy “The Assa.ssin” Sing rose to fame with an estimated k1ll total of 150 300, and his alleged duel with the Ottoman marksman nicknamed “Abdullah the Terrible” is sometimes considered the first recorded sniper duel. The Allies also tried limited “bite and hold”
@ttacks to gain local tactical advantage, but these were costly and had no real impact. Morale suffered another blow when the Royal Navy withdrew some of its ships after several were sunk by German U boats, and respected French General Henri Gouraud was evacuated after losing an arm. As Allied troops got sicker in the summer heat, Allied commanders came up with a new plan.
After much discussion with London, Hamilton decided on a two part offensive: the Anzacs would break out, and fresh British divisions would land at nearby Suvla Bay would secure a harbor for better supply over the winter. The Germans and Ottomans expected a new Allied offensive, but they weren’t sure where, so they divided their reserves between the neck of the peninsula and the Asian shore. The Allies struck on August 6.
They launched diversionary @ttacks at Cape Helles, and on the southern part of the Anzac sector at Lone Pine to distract from the main effort on the northern Anzac sector. Lone Pine, known as Bl00dy Ridge in Turkish, became infamous for fierce night time hand to hand f1ghting in Turkish trenches and dugouts, which resulted in seven Victoria Crosses aw4rded to Australian troops.
Australian sold1er John Gammage described t he carnage: “The wounded bod1es of both Turks and Anzacs were piled up 3 and 4 deep … the b0mbs simply poured in but as fast as our men went down another would take his place.” (Department of Veterans’ Affairs) [John Gammage] But everything depended on the main thrust, a two pronged @ttack to take the high ground of Sari Bair Ridge.
A British, Australian, and Indian force moved tow4rds the high point of Hill Q and Hill 971, but many were sick, they became disoriented in the confusing ravines at night, and ran into Ottoman resistance. A single Gurkha battalion managed to make it to the top of Hill Q on August 7, but then Ottoman reinforcements arrived and they withdrew.
Meanwhile the New Zealanders moved tow4rds the height of Chunuk Bair, which they were supposed to take before linking up with Australians advancing from a position called the Nek. The Australians, including Light Horse units f1ghting dismounted, @ttacked at the Nek but in an infamous action, the Ottomans immediately stopped them and inflicted terrible losses.
The New Zealanders fought their way onto part of the summit of Chunuk Bair, before inexperienced British troops relieved them. Ottoman reinforcements led by Mustafa Kemal then counter@ttacked and recaptured the entire peak. Chunuk Bair became known in Turkish as Kemal’s Place, and the b4ttle caused some hard feelings between New Zealanders and Brits. New Zealand sold1er Leonard Hart reflected on the defeat: “Much bl4me and ill feeling has been created between the Colonials and Tommies over them not putting up a better f1ght when the Turks @ttacked, but I am inclined to think that, judging by the frightful losses sustained by the
Wellington and Auckland battalions while holding this position, we would not have done much better.” (Macleod 57) [Leonard Hart] Two of the three highest points on the Sari Bair Ridge were briefly in Allied hands, but with the Ottomans in control again by August 10 and many Allied troops too sick to f1ght, the Anzac offensive had failed.
Losses were heavy on both sides, with 83% of Anzac casualties from sickness (Macleod 63). Meanwhile, British troops landed at Suvla Bay. They would soon outnumber the Ottoman defenders 9 to 1, but they couldn’t take advantage. Landing boats got stuck on sand bars, and units landed at the wrong place – an Irish division ended up split between opposite ends of the bay.
General Frederick Stopford was too cautious, and stru.ggled to communicate with his scattered formations. These difficulties combined with a lack of water, meant the British wasted vital time before trying to take the high ground inland. Both sides planned @ttacks for the early morning of August 9, but since the Ottomans had the advantage of the higher ground, they stopped the British from breaking out of their small beachhead.
Trench stalemate once again ruled the b4ttlefield, and the Allies had another thin beachhead to protect and supply. The Ottomans had won what they called the Battle of Anafartarlar, and Stopford lost his command. The Allies great August offensive failed like those before it, but the campaign and the suffering of the men continued.
Allied commanders once again argued about what to do next. They discussed large French landings on the Asian shore, new naval @ttacks, or landings at Bulair. There were even rumours of Italian reinforcements. But others felt the entire operation should be abandoned. French General Maurice Bailloud shared his doubts with Paris, and influential journalists Ellis Ashmead Bartlett and Keith Murdoch secretly lobbied the Australian government to pressure London to evacuate.
Meanwhile, the bitter stru.ggle in the trenches continued. As part of a successful attempt to link the Anzac and Suvla beachheads, Allied troops, including New Zealand Maori units, faced a tough stru.ggle at Hill 60 in late August. The Newfoundland Regiment arrived in September, and faced its baptism of fire – their most important action being the capture of what became known as Caribou Hill to eliminate Ottoman snipers.
Cooler weather and autumn storms also added to the men’s discomfort. Austro Hungarian heavy artillery arrived to bolster Ottoman firepower, but Von Sanders did not launch a major @ttack. On October 31, General Charles Monro replaced Hamilton, and quickly recommended evacuation. There was no hope of breaking out, and Bulgaria’s entry into the w4r on the Central Powers’ side in September changed the strategic situation.
Germany could now supply the Ottoman Empire more easily overland, and the Allies wanted to concentrate more troops in Salonika. London approved in December, and on January 9, 1916, the last Allied troops left Gallipoli in a sk1llfully ex3cuted evacuation that surprised the Ottomans. The Gallipoli campaign lasted eight months, and casualty estimates vary.
The Allies suffered at least 130,000 k1lled and wounded. Approximately 71,000 were British, 26,000 Australian, 23,000 French, 7200 New Zealanders, 5500 Indian, and 150 Newfoundlanders. Other estimates have Allied casualties over 200,000. The Ottoman Empire may have lost up to 250,000 (Macleod 67). The Ottomans lost more men, but they had won a strategic victory.
Their tenacity and decisiveness in the critical early days, not least by Mustafa Kemal, ensured that they stopped the invasion of the Empire. The Allies failed because of indecisiveness, overly complex b4ttle plans, and a lack of coordination. The Allies usually outnumbered the Ottomans, but this wasn’t enough, and they lacked artillery.
The Ottomans sent their best officers and troops to defend the peninsula, whereas British, French, and sometimes Anzac officers were often ineffective or inexperienced. A recent study concluded that even had the Allies broken out, they couldn’t have sustained an advance across the peninsula anyway (Macleod). More than a century later, the campaign has left a lasting mark in Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand.
For the former enemies, Gallipoli stands out in their collective memory as a moment that still shapes their national identities today. We want thank BlackMill Games and their game Gallipoli for sponsoring this video. Gallipoli is the newest entry in their ongoing World W4r 1 Game Series. After Verdun, Tannenberg & Isonzo Gallipoli takes the players to the Ottoman b4ttlefields of the First World W4r.
Fight with your squad on the shores of Anzac Cove and V Beach or the wider Mesopotamian campaign featuring authentic w3apons, gear, and uniforms. Pick one of many cla.sses with distinct specializations and work as a team across PC and Consoles with crossplay. Check out and wishlist Gallipoli through the links in the descr.i.ption. Don’t miss the launch of Gallipoli on PC, PlayStation 5 and Xbox Series X|S.
We also want to thank Beatrice Braun Arnold for her help with this episode. To learn more about the First World W4r in 1915, check out our videos about the First Battle of Ypres and the Winter Battlers on the Eastern Front.
As usual you can find all the sources for this video in the descr.i.ption below, I am Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel that knows: Istanbul was Constantinople, Now it’s Istanbul, not Constantinople.
In early 1915, the Western Front was bogged down in a trench stalemate. Some British leaders, like First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, looked to other fronts for easier opportunities. Striking at the Ottoman Empire, Germany’s weakest ally, might gain Britain a quick and decisive victory.
The Ottomans controlled the vital Turkish Straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, which connected the Mediterranean and Black Seas. If the British could take the Straits and thre4ten Constantinople, they might knock the Ottomans out of the w4r and open a new supply line for the hard pressed Russians, who asked Britain for help in January 1915. A British victory might also favourably influence neutral Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece – and gain prestige for the Royal Navy given the w4r’s focus was on land.
Churchill had visions of historic proportions: “Think what Constantinople is to the East. It is more than London, Paris and Berlin all rolled into one are to the West. Think how it has dominated the East. Think what its fall will mean.” (Hart The Great W4r 167) We want to thank BlackMill Games and their upcoming Gallipoli game for sponsoring this documentary and providing some of their detailed in game models.
To learn more about Gallipoli, the new entry in the WW1 Game Series, check out the links in the descr.i.ption below. Taking the Straits though, would not be easy. The Gallipoli Peninsula protected the waterway, and its terrain was very rugged, split by hills and steep ravines – a problem already highlighted by British and Greek planners in the past.
Nearly all British ground forces though were on the Western Front, so Churchill pushed for a risky naval only @ttack. British and French w4rships would destr0y the Ottomans’ coastal forts and g.uns as they steamed 60km to the Sea of Marmara. Once they got there, they could force Constantinople to surrender. Initially, not everyone shared Churchill’s optimism.
W4r Minister Lord Kitchener was lukew4rm, and naval officers, including First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher, argued w4rships would be too vulnerable in the narrow waterway. Churchill though, won over some doubters and the W4r Council approved. The Russians even promised to help from the Black Sea, though this never materialized. Meanwhile, the Ottomans expected a possible British @ttack.
The coastal forts and g.uns were part of the Fortified Command Area under Brigad1er Cevat Pasha, and 500 German troops arrived to train and advise. Some of the forts along the straits were outdated, but others had modern German g.uns. They also had 230 mobile g.uns and howitzers concealed inland, meant to pierce w4rships’ fragile decks.
The Ottomans also laid mines, spread anti submarine nets, installed torpedo tubes, and positioned the German built w4rship Yavuz at the narrows. On February 19, 67 Allied w4rships arrived at the Dardanelles, including 16 mostly older b4ttleships. They sh3lled Ottoman positions several times, but the ships’ g.uns were meant to fire on a flat trajectory and couldn’t reach the Ottomans’ inland howitzers.
New Allied naval commander Rear Admiral John De Robeck led an all out @ttack on March 18, and three lines of British and French ships exchanged heavy fire with the Ottoman g.uns. At one fort, Ottoman Corporal Seyit loaded a heavy sh3ll on his own after his g.un’s loading mechanism was damaged – and later became a national hero in Turkey.
Unbeknownst to the Allies, Ottoman minelayer Nusret had recently laid new mines, and several ships ran into them or were hit by sh3lls. Ottoman officer Ashir Arkayan watched as French b4ttleship Bouvet went down with 640 hands: “The Bouvet started to withdraw, but at that moment a cloud of red and bl4ck smoke arose from under the ship, which may have struck a mine.
Immediately after this there was a much more vi0lent explosion. We believed that a sh3ll from had blown up the magazine. The ship heeled over at once and her crew poured into the sea.” (Hart Gallipoli 38) Soon, two more ships sank , several others were damaged, and the fleet withdrew. The big ships had failed because they couldn’t hit the enemy, Ottoman howitzers were effective, and Allied minesweepers couldn’t clear mines due to Ottoman artillery.
Some have argued that if had tried again the next day as planned, the ships could have made it. But this is unlikely, since the Ottomans still had plenty of ammunition and 400 more sea mines in the water. The Allied naval @ttack had failed thanks to Ottoman resistance and British underestimation of the enemy.
Now, British commanders decided to land troops on the Gallipoli peninsula to take the Dardanelles forts from behind. In mid March, British General Ian Hamilton arrived to command the 50,000 strong Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, or MEF. The MEF included British and Indian units as well as the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps, or ANZAC, and was joined by 18,000 French troops.
The main landing would be by British units at Cape Helles in the south, to capture the height of Achi Baba and move on the forts. Meanwhile the Anzacs would land further north to thre4ten Ottoman logistics. To distract the Ottomans, the Royal Naval Division would thre4ten a landing at Bulair, and the French would temporarily land on the Asian side. Some French thought the plan would fail, as did the Sultan of Egypt.
On the Ottoman side, German General Liman von Sanders took command in late March. He modified the Ottoman forw4rd defense plan, placing reserves inland to counter@ttack after landings. His 5th Army was mostly Turkish, but included several Syrian Arab regiments. Brigad1er General Esat Pasha’s III Corps would be responsible for defending the Canakkale Fortified Zone, and many of his troops were experienced from the recent Balkan W4rs.
On April 25, 1915, 200 Allied ships steamed from nearby Lemnos. The Anzacs landed first, but in the pre dawn darkness, the small steam pinnaces towing their rowboats from the b4ttleship lose their way and they landed off target at Ari Burnu – also known as Anzac Cove. Australian officer Stanley Weir was surprised to meet resistance: “We thought our landing was to be effected quite unopposed, but when our boats were within about 30 yards of the beach heavy rifle and machine g.un fire was opened upon us, we had to row for another 15 yards or so before we reached water shallow
enough to get out of the boats.” (Macleod 30) The few Ottoman defenders, equally sh0cked, scrambled to respond: “I was still asleep [when] the sentry started shouting, ‘There’s something unusual. Get up!’ Then the company commander ordered us all to move up into the trenches.
we saw there were lots of them pouring out of their boats. We opened fire and they dropped down on the beach with the g.uns in their hands.” (Macleod 31) The terrain beyond the beach was difficult, made up of steep gullies that made command and control, and orientation difficult for the inexperienced Anzacs and their officers. Anzac commander General William Birdwood decided to secure some of the high ground but left the highest part of the Sari Bair Ridge to his north for later.
The Ottomans sprang into action, with Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal leading reinforcements onto the ridge and @ttacking the Anzacs’ vulnerable northern flank. Fighting raged with hilltops changing hands – the Anzacs outnumbered the Ottomans two to one, but the Ottomans were better organized and had good artillery support. Ottoman officers were more experienced and more decisive – especially Kemal, who issued a dr4matic message: “I do not a.ssume that any one of us would not rather d1e than repeat the shameful history of the Balkan W4r. Should we however have any such men among us, we will immediately arr.est them
and put them up for ex3cution.” (Leonhard 269) In his later memoirs, Kemal likely embellished his now famous “I do not expect you to @ttack, I order you to d1e” command of the same day. In any case the Ottomans prevented the Anzacs from taking the ridge, and the Australians and New Zealanders dig in. Some Anzac officers feared they’d be overrun the next day, but the line held.
Meanwhile, as part of the diversions, the Royal Naval Division waited on ships in the Gulf of Saros but, as planned, never disembarked. The French diversionary force landed near the Kum Kale fort, and fought a bitter overnight b4ttle: “The Senegalese scaled the fort’s parapet, led by Lieutenant Bonavista, who was k1lled.
Captain Brison was sh0t through the arm, but refused to be treated and continued to command his company, which captured the fort with heavy losses.” (Feirrera 48) [W4r Diary of the Corps expéditionnaire d’orient] The French and African troops then withstood several Ottoman counter@ttacks with the support of naval g.unfire, before withdrawing as intended the next day.
For the main @ttack at Cape Helles, British troops landed at five beaches. They take two lightly defended beaches easily, but command and control confusion causes troops at one beach to dig in prematurely and evacuate the next morning. Fighting is intense at the two main beaches even though the British far outnumber the Ottomans.
Ottoman sold1er Abdul Rahman begged his commander for help: “ with the 20 or 25 men I have with me, it will not be possible to drive [the British] off with a bayonet charge I can see it is absolutely certain that they will land more men tonight. Alas, alas, my Captain! For the sake of Allah send me reinforcements because hundreds of sold1ers are landing! Hurry! What on earth will happen, my Captain?” (Broadbent, 84) At W Beach, the second British wave breaks through the Ottoman defenses after tough f1ghting at the foot of the cliffs – six men
from the Lancashire Fusiliers later received the Victoria Cross for actions that morning. At V Beach British troops on the steamer River Clyde stru.ggle to get ashore, the naval g.unfire isn’t effective, and the Ottomans rain de@dly fire on the landing boats. Captain David French of the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers ran the gauntlet: “ the water around seemed to be alive, the bull3ts striking the sea all around us.
thought I had got through safely when they put [a bull3t] through my arm. The fellows in the regiment told me I was getting too fat to run, but those who saw me go through that bit of water changed their opinions later – I ran like h3ll!” (Hart The Great W4r 173) [David French] The V beach landing seemed in danger, but British success at neighboring beaches allowed them to secure it, partly thanks to dr4matic bayonet charges by Irish troops to capture a key hill.
Still, but the en d of the day, the highest point overlooking the coastal forts, Achi Baba, was still in Ottoman hands. So the MEF had pulled off a successful, opposed amphibious landing – a first in modern w4rfare. But the greatly outnumbered Ottomans had stopped the Allies close to the beaches. Some have argued this was a vindication of Von Sanders’ new defensive scheme, while others say the original Ottoman defence plan would have worked even better. Both sides now brought in reinforcements and went over to the @ttack.
Within days, the Royal Naval Division and French contingent joined the line at Cape Helles after their diversions on April 25. The Allies tried to break the stalemate by taking the town of Krithia and moving on Achi Baba – they @ttacked in late April, in May, and again in early June.
But they could not break the Ottoman lines in any of the three Battles of Krithia. A French report documented the futility: “As soon as the offensive began a strong and well deployed enemy offered energetic resistance our line was pinned down 200m from strong trenches covered by machine g.uns. It’s impossible to get up the Kereves Dere [spur].” (Feirrera 53) Hamilton’s b4ttle plans were too complex and the British lacked artillery, so their greatest advance was just 900m.
The Ottomans counter@ttacked several times, but suffered very heavy losses for no gain. Neither side could break the stalemate at Cape Helles. Meanwhile, at Anzac Cove, the Ottomans launched their biggest counter@ttack so far. On the night of May 18, they stormed the Anzac trenches – but they lacked artillery support, and British aircraft had detected preparations beforehand so the Anzacs knew they were coming.
In about 12 hours, the Ottomans lost 10,000 de@d and wounded to just 600 Anzacs – Von Sanders later admitted the @ttack was a mistake. The two sides agreed to a truce to bury the piles of de@d, and Australian Compton Mackenzie helped with the grisly work: “Looking down I saw squelching up from the ground on either side of my boot like a rotten mangold the deliquescent green and bl4ck flesh of a Turk’s head.
nothing would cleanse the smell of de4th from the nostrils for a fortnight afterw4rds.” (Macleod 2) The ma.ssacre caused some Anzacs to feel renewed empathy or respect for the other side. An Ottoman officer reflected: “At this spectacle even the most gentle must feel s4vage and the most s4vage must weep.” (Macleod 2) So by early summer, there was no end in sight to the trench stalemate on Gallipoli.
And even when the troops weren’t f1ghting, the peninsula was a h3llish place to be. As the Allies and Ottomans traded blows on Gallipoli, the men on both sides suffered terribly from the peninsula’s uniquely bad conditions. The Allies’ beachheads were so small, that there was hardly any rear area to speak of – which meant that everything was in range of enemy g.uns all the time.
The rugged terrain also meant that digging latrines was more difficult, as was evacuating casualties. British sold1er John Simpson Kirkpatrick later became famous for using a donkey to transport the wounded down the steep ravines at Anzac Cove. He was k1lled May 19. The buildup of rotting bod1es led to a plague of flies that tormented the men, and diseases like typhus and dysentery ravaged Allied ranks.
Disease incapacitated more Allied sold1ers than combat, a problem made worse by the constant and severe shortage of water. A lack of beds on hospital ships or on Lemnos also meant that, especially early in the campaign, the British and French stru.ggled to treat casualties in time. This all had an effect on morale, which began to fall from July.
Ottoman troops also suffered from the heat and stench – but their deep hinterland and shorter overland supply lines meant they had enough food and water, and enough hospital beds for the wounded – and they suffered very little from disease. Even though there was a pause in major offensives, smaller scale f1ghting continued and both sides adapted.
Allied forces converted jam tins into hand grenades, which they sometimes used as booby traps. Snipers and sharpshooters who were especially sk1lled with the Mauser or Lee Enfield rifle became a fixture – Australian William Beech even developed a periscope rifle to fire from safety. Although the Ottomans didn’t have telescopic sights, they had the advantage of the high ground. British officer A.P.
Herbert complained: “We lost twelve men each day as they stood up from their cooking or carelessly raised their heads and in the night there were sudden screams where a sentry had moved his head too often against the moon.” (Pegler 106) [A.P. Herbert] Australian sniper Billy “The Assa.ssin” Sing rose to fame with an estimated k1ll total of 150 300, and his alleged duel with the Ottoman marksman nicknamed “Abdullah the Terrible” is sometimes considered the first recorded sniper duel. The Allies also tried limited “bite and hold”
@ttacks to gain local tactical advantage, but these were costly and had no real impact. Morale suffered another blow when the Royal Navy withdrew some of its ships after several were sunk by German U boats, and respected French General Henri Gouraud was evacuated after losing an arm. As Allied troops got sicker in the summer heat, Allied commanders came up with a new plan.
After much discussion with London, Hamilton decided on a two part offensive: the Anzacs would break out, and fresh British divisions would land at nearby Suvla Bay would secure a harbor for better supply over the winter. The Germans and Ottomans expected a new Allied offensive, but they weren’t sure where, so they divided their reserves between the neck of the peninsula and the Asian shore. The Allies struck on August 6.
They launched diversionary @ttacks at Cape Helles, and on the southern part of the Anzac sector at Lone Pine to distract from the main effort on the northern Anzac sector. Lone Pine, known as Bl00dy Ridge in Turkish, became infamous for fierce night time hand to hand f1ghting in Turkish trenches and dugouts, which resulted in seven Victoria Crosses aw4rded to Australian troops.
Australian sold1er John Gammage described t he carnage: “The wounded bod1es of both Turks and Anzacs were piled up 3 and 4 deep … the b0mbs simply poured in but as fast as our men went down another would take his place.” (Department of Veterans’ Affairs) [John Gammage] But everything depended on the main thrust, a two pronged @ttack to take the high ground of Sari Bair Ridge.
A British, Australian, and Indian force moved tow4rds the high point of Hill Q and Hill 971, but many were sick, they became disoriented in the confusing ravines at night, and ran into Ottoman resistance. A single Gurkha battalion managed to make it to the top of Hill Q on August 7, but then Ottoman reinforcements arrived and they withdrew.
Meanwhile the New Zealanders moved tow4rds the height of Chunuk Bair, which they were supposed to take before linking up with Australians advancing from a position called the Nek. The Australians, including Light Horse units f1ghting dismounted, @ttacked at the Nek but in an infamous action, the Ottomans immediately stopped them and inflicted terrible losses.
The New Zealanders fought their way onto part of the summit of Chunuk Bair, before inexperienced British troops relieved them. Ottoman reinforcements led by Mustafa Kemal then counter@ttacked and recaptured the entire peak. Chunuk Bair became known in Turkish as Kemal’s Place, and the b4ttle caused some hard feelings between New Zealanders and Brits. New Zealand sold1er Leonard Hart reflected on the defeat: “Much bl4me and ill feeling has been created between the Colonials and Tommies over them not putting up a better f1ght when the Turks @ttacked, but I am inclined to think that, judging by the frightful losses sustained by the
Wellington and Auckland battalions while holding this position, we would not have done much better.” (Macleod 57) [Leonard Hart] Two of the three highest points on the Sari Bair Ridge were briefly in Allied hands, but with the Ottomans in control again by August 10 and many Allied troops too sick to f1ght, the Anzac offensive had failed.
Losses were heavy on both sides, with 83% of Anzac casualties from sickness (Macleod 63). Meanwhile, British troops landed at Suvla Bay. They would soon outnumber the Ottoman defenders 9 to 1, but they couldn’t take advantage. Landing boats got stuck on sand bars, and units landed at the wrong place – an Irish division ended up split between opposite ends of the bay.
General Frederick Stopford was too cautious, and stru.ggled to communicate with his scattered formations. These difficulties combined with a lack of water, meant the British wasted vital time before trying to take the high ground inland. Both sides planned @ttacks for the early morning of August 9, but since the Ottomans had the advantage of the higher ground, they stopped the British from breaking out of their small beachhead.
Trench stalemate once again ruled the b4ttlefield, and the Allies had another thin beachhead to protect and supply. The Ottomans had won what they called the Battle of Anafartarlar, and Stopford lost his command. The Allies great August offensive failed like those before it, but the campaign and the suffering of the men continued.
Allied commanders once again argued about what to do next. They discussed large French landings on the Asian shore, new naval @ttacks, or landings at Bulair. There were even rumours of Italian reinforcements. But others felt the entire operation should be abandoned. French General Maurice Bailloud shared his doubts with Paris, and influential journalists Ellis Ashmead Bartlett and Keith Murdoch secretly lobbied the Australian government to pressure London to evacuate.
Meanwhile, the bitter stru.ggle in the trenches continued. As part of a successful attempt to link the Anzac and Suvla beachheads, Allied troops, including New Zealand Maori units, faced a tough stru.ggle at Hill 60 in late August. The Newfoundland Regiment arrived in September, and faced its baptism of fire – their most important action being the capture of what became known as Caribou Hill to eliminate Ottoman snipers.
Cooler weather and autumn storms also added to the men’s discomfort. Austro Hungarian heavy artillery arrived to bolster Ottoman firepower, but Von Sanders did not launch a major @ttack. On October 31, General Charles Monro replaced Hamilton, and quickly recommended evacuation. There was no hope of breaking out, and Bulgaria’s entry into the w4r on the Central Powers’ side in September changed the strategic situation.
Germany could now supply the Ottoman Empire more easily overland, and the Allies wanted to concentrate more troops in Salonika. London approved in December, and on January 9, 1916, the last Allied troops left Gallipoli in a sk1llfully ex3cuted evacuation that surprised the Ottomans. The Gallipoli campaign lasted eight months, and casualty estimates vary.
The Allies suffered at least 130,000 k1lled and wounded. Approximately 71,000 were British, 26,000 Australian, 23,000 French, 7200 New Zealanders, 5500 Indian, and 150 Newfoundlanders. Other estimates have Allied casualties over 200,000. The Ottoman Empire may have lost up to 250,000 (Macleod 67). The Ottomans lost more men, but they had won a strategic victory.
Their tenacity and decisiveness in the critical early days, not least by Mustafa Kemal, ensured that they stopped the invasion of the Empire. The Allies failed because of indecisiveness, overly complex b4ttle plans, and a lack of coordination. The Allies usually outnumbered the Ottomans, but this wasn’t enough, and they lacked artillery.
The Ottomans sent their best officers and troops to defend the peninsula, whereas British, French, and sometimes Anzac officers were often ineffective or inexperienced. A recent study concluded that even had the Allies broken out, they couldn’t have sustained an advance across the peninsula anyway (Macleod). More than a century later, the campaign has left a lasting mark in Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand.
For the former enemies, Gallipoli stands out in their collective memory as a moment that still shapes their national identities today. We want thank BlackMill Games and their game Gallipoli for sponsoring this video. Gallipoli is the newest entry in their ongoing World W4r 1 Game Series. After Verdun, Tannenberg & Isonzo Gallipoli takes the players to the Ottoman b4ttlefields of the First World W4r.
Fight with your squad on the shores of Anzac Cove and V Beach or the wider Mesopotamian campaign featuring authentic w3apons, gear, and uniforms. Pick one of many cla.sses with distinct specializations and work as a team across PC and Consoles with crossplay. Check out and wishlist Gallipoli through the links in the descr.i.ption. Don’t miss the launch of Gallipoli on PC, PlayStation 5 and Xbox Series X|S.
We also want to thank Beatrice Braun Arnold for her help with this episode. To learn more about the First World W4r in 1915, check out our videos about the First Battle of Ypres and the Winter Battlers on the Eastern Front.
As usual you can find all the sources for this video in the descr.i.ption below, I am Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel that knows: Istanbul was Constantinople, Now it’s Istanbul, not Constantinople.
