Captain Robert Shannon pushed all four throttles forward at 0720 on May 29th, 1943 and felt 16 tons of experimental gunship drag itself off the runway at RAF Alcenbury while every standard B7F in the 92nd bomb group pulled away from him into the gray English sky. He was 29. 41 missions over occupied Europe.
Not a single confirmed kill from the aircraft the Army Air Forces had just strapped him into. More than 200 FAWolf 190’s and Meersmid 109’s were already circling the submarine pens at Satnazair, waiting for the formation to arrive. Shannon’s YB40 carried 16 50 caliber Browning machine guns, four more than a standard flying fortress.
A second dorsal turret sat behind the radio room. Twin guns replaced single mounts at each waist position. And beneath the nose, installed 3 months earlier at the Douglas Modification Center in Tulsa, a remotely operated Bendix chin turret gave Shannon’s bombardier two more guns aimed straight ahead.
The aircraft weighed 4,000 lb more than the B7Fs climbing toward France. Every gun position carried triple the normal ammunition load, 11,200 rounds versus 3,900. The Bombay held nothing but ammunition belts and armor plating. By November 1942, Luftwaffa fighter pilots had identified the flying fortress’s fatal weakness, the nose.
Only four machine guns protected the cockpit and bombardier station from frontal attack. A skilled pilot could close head-on at combined speeds exceeding 500 mph, fire a 3-second burst, and peel away before American gunners could track him. The tactic required nerve. It worked. Between January and May 1943, the 8th Air Force lost more than 400 heavy bombers over Europe.
Most died from head-on passes. The United States Army Air Forces needed a solution before deep penetration missions into Germany became impossible. Long range fighter escorts like the P-51 Mustang were still in development. Bomber crews were on their own. Someone at rightfield proposed converting flying fortresses into heavily armed escorts, gunships that would fly alongside standard bombers and destroy attacking fighters with concentrated defensive fire.
Lockheed Vega built a prototype XB40. In September 1942, Douglas aircraft modified 25 B17Fs between February and April 1943. 13 became service test YB40s. Four became TB40 trainers. The rest stayed stateside. Colonel William Reed, commander of the 92nd Bomb Group at Alenbury, received 12 YB40s. On May 8th, his 327th Bombardment Squadron would test the gunship concept in combat.
Reed examined the modifications and sent a message to 8th Air Force headquarters. The YB40 was too heavy. It would never work. Nobody listened. Shannon crossed the English Channel at 18,000 ft. Formation speed 180 mph. His YB40 struggled to maintain position. The extra weight and drag from additional gun turrets reduced climb performance by half.
A standard B17F reached 20,000 ft in 25 minutes. Shannon’s gunship needed 48 minutes to reach the same altitude. Over San Nazair, German flack batteries opened up. Black puffs of 88 millimeter shells bracketed the formation. Shannon’s bombardier tracked targets through the Bendix Chin turret site. The twin 50s swiveled smoothly, responsive, accurate, different from the handheld nose guns on standard fortresses.
When fuckwolves attacked from 12:00 high, the chin turret gunner engaged first. Two attacking fighters broke off, one trailing smoke. The bombing run lasted 11 minutes. Shannon’s group hit the submarine pens and turned for home. Then the problem Reed had predicted became obvious. The B17Fs, no longer carrying bomb loads, accelerated to 210 mph.
Shannon’s YB40, still weighted down with 11,000 rounds of ammunition and extra armor couldn’t keep up. What happened to Shannon over the channel is coming next. If you’re with us so far, please drop a like. That’s how YouTube knows to put forgotten stories like this one in front of more viewers. Subscribe if you haven’t yet. Now, back to Shannon.
His YB40 fell behind the formation. The other six gunships in the mission struggled with the same problem. Over the channel, Shannon watched the bomber stream disappear ahead of him. Alone, slow, exactly what no bomber crew wanted to be over occupied France. But in his bombardier station, technical sergeant James Harmon kept the Bendix Chin turret tracking for fighters.
That turret had worked, the only thing on the YB40 that justified its weight. 2 weeks later, Shannon would fly his sixth YB40 mission. By August, the program would be cancelled. All 12 gunships withdrawn from combat. But that chin turret, someone at 8th Air Force headquarters was paying attention to how well it performed against head-on attacks.
At 8th Air Force Headquarters in High Wickham, a staff officer named Major Thomas Hendris compiled mission reports from the 92nd Bomb Group. June 2nd, 1943, 3 days after the Saint Nazair raid, seven YB40 gunships had flown the mission. All seven fell behind their formations on the return flight. Two became stragglers.
One nearly got picked off by a messmmit before friendly fighters intervened. Hendrickx read through the afteraction reports. Standard B7F crews reported the YB40s were ineffective as escorts, too slow, couldn’t maintain formation integrity. But every bombadier who flew near a YB40 mentioned the same thing. That chin turret.
It engaged attacking fighters 3 to 4 seconds faster than handheld nose guns. Head-on attacks that normally broke formations were being disrupted before fighters could close to lethal range. The 92nd flew its second YB40 mission on June 11th. Target Wilhelms Havin. Shannon commanded one of four gunships assigned to the raid. German fighters concentrated on the lead elements.
Shannon’s chin turret gunner, Sergeant Harmon, fired 600 rounds during three head-on passes. Two Faulk Wvolves broke off smoking, one confirmed kill. After bombs away, the same problem. Shannon’s overweight fortress dropped behind. By the time he crossed the Dutch coast, the main formation was 15 miles ahead.
Colonel Reed sent another message to Highwick. The YB40 program should be terminated immediately. The gunships were more liability than asset. They attracted attacks instead of deterring them. German pilots recognized the aircraft with extra turrets. No bombs meant the YB40 stayed heavy throughout the mission. Easy target. Reed recommended one modification be retained. The Bendix Chin turret.
Install it on standard B7s. Scrap everything else. Between May 29th and June 22nd, the 327th squadron flew eight YB 40 missions. 43 Sordies credited. Five German fighters confirmed destroyed. Two probables. Loss rate. One YB40 shot down over Hoos on June 22nd. Tail number 425741. Entire crew killed.
The aircraft had been carrying 16 guns and 11,000 rounds of ammunition. None of it prevented a sustained fighter attack once the gunship fell behind its formation. Major Hendrickx prepared a statistical analysis for Brigadier General Frederick Anderson, ETH Bomber Command. The numbers were clear. YB40s increased formation defensive firepower by approximately 20%.
Actual effectiveness against German fighters, 10% improvement over standard B17Fs. Most of that 10% came from the Bendix chin turret engaging head-on attacks. The additional dorsal turret, waste guns, and ammunition load contributed almost nothing to combat effectiveness while adding 4,000 lbs of dead weight.
Shannon flew his fourth YB40 mission on June 26th. The aircraft assigned to the raid couldn’t form up with the bomber stream. Mechanical issues. All returned to Alcenbury without dropping ordinance. Wasted fuel. Wasted effort. On July 4th, Shannon led three YB40s to La Palace. His Chin turret gunner engaged eight times during the mission.
Four German fighters damaged. But over the Bay of Bisque, Shannon’s fortress lagged 30 minutes behind the formation. 30 minutes alone over water patrolled by German fighters. He made it back barely. Wrightfield in Ohio began design work on a new Flying Fortress variant in early July. Designation B17G. Boeing, Douglas, and Vega would split production.
First aircraft scheduled to roll off assembly lines in August. The modifications list included one item from the failed YB40 program, a factoryinstalled Bendix Chin turret. Standard equipment. Every B7G would carry it. 8,680 aircraft on order. At Alenbury, Shannon prepared for his sixth YB40 mission. July 29th, target KE submarine yards.
The 327th Squadron had orders to fly two more missions. Then the program would be evaluated, either continued or terminated. Shannon knew which way that evaluation would go. Everyone knew. The YB40 was a failure. But when he climbed into the Bombardier station for pre-flight checks, he tested that chin turret one more time.
Smooth traverse, clean sight picture. The only thing worth saving from 5 months of wasted effort. The question was whether anyone at 8th Air Force headquarters would figure that out before it was too late. On July 29th, 1943, Shannon lifted off from Alenbury for the last time in a YB40. Target Keel. Two gunships assigned to the mission.
The 92nd Bomb Group sent 112 B17Fs against German submarine construction yards on the Baltic coast. Deep penetration, maximum range. No fighter escort past the Danish border. Over Keel. Flack was heavy. Accurate. 88 mm shells burst at exactly 18,000 ft. Shannon’s formation lost two fortresses before bombs away. German fighters hit them during the turn for home.
Measure Schmidz attacked from 12:00 level. Standard head-on pass. Shannon’s chin turd gunner engaged at 800 yd. The Bendix mount tracked smoothly. First burst hit the lead messers in the engine cowling. The fighter rolled left, trailing white coolant vapor. Second fighter broke off without firing. The chin turret had disrupted the attack pattern before German pilots could close to lethal range.
But after bombs away, Shannon fell behind again. The problem that defined every YB40 mission. His air speed dropped to 170 mph while the formation accelerated to 210. By the time Shannon crossed the Danish coast, he was alone. His ball turd gunner called out fighters at 4:00 low. Three fuckwolves climbing to intercept. Shannon pushed the throttles forward.
The right cyclones were already at maximum continuous power. Not enough. The fighters closed. Shannon’s waist gunners opened fire at 600 yd. Twin 50s on each side. The additional firepower from the YB40 modifications finally proved useful. One fwolf turned away. The other two pressed the attack. Shannon’s top turret gunner caught the second fighter with a sustained burst.
Pieces flew off the left wing. The fogwolf snap rolled and dove toward the North Sea. The third fighter made one pass at the tail and departed. Ammunition depleted or damaged. Shannon landed at Alcenbury 4 hours and 18 minutes after takeoff. Fuel tanks nearly empty. Every gun position had expended more than 60% of its ammunition load.
The YB40 had survived, but only because German fighters broke off the pursuit. If they had pressed the attack for another three minutes, Shannon would have been another statistic. Colonel Reed filed his final report on the YB40 program on August 3rd. 12 aircraft, 14 combat missions, 48 credited sordies, total German fighters destroyed, five confirmed, two probable, one YB40 lost to enemy action.
Tactical assessment complete failure. The escort gunship concept was fundamentally flawed. Heavy bombers could not escort other heavy bombers. The weight penalty was insurmountable. Reed recommended immediate termination of the program. All YB40s should be converted back to standard B7F configuration or returned to the United States for training duties.
One paragraph in Reed’s report addressed the Bendix chin turret. Estimated effectiveness against head-on attacks. 70% disruption rate. German fighters approaching from 12:00 were forced to break off or alter their attack angle three times out of four when engaged by the chin turret. The modification added only 800 lb to aircraft weight, minimal drag penalty.
Reed recommended the Chin turret be installed on all flying fortresses as soon as production capacity allowed. On August 5th, 1943, General Iraker, commander of 8th Air Force, approved Reed’s recommendation. The YB40 program was terminated. All 12 gunships would return to the United States by November. The 92nd Bomb Group would receive standard B17Fs as replacements.
But at Boeing Seattle plant, Douglas aircraft in Long Beach, and Vega in Burbank, production lines were already retooling. The B17G Flying Fortress. First production block scheduled for delivery in 3 weeks. Every aircraft would carry 1350 caliber machine guns, including one Bendix Chin turret mounted beneath the Bombardier station.
Factory installed standard equipment. The initial production order called for 8,680 aircraft. At right field, engineers were calculating how many bomber crews would survive missions over Germany because of that single modification. The numbers were staggering. If the Chin turret reduced successful head-on attacks by 70% and head-on attacks accounted for 40% of bomber losses, then thousands of airmen would come home who otherwise would have died.
All because of a gunship program that lasted 14 missions. Shannon never flew a B7G. He completed his tour in a standard fortress and rotated back to the United States in October 1943. But the chin turret he had tested over France and Germany was about to change the air war over Europe. The first B17G flying fortress landed at RAF Bassingorn on September 9th, 1943.
Tail number 4231,000. The aircraft gleamed under gray English skies. Ground crews gathered to inspect the modifications. The chin turret dominated the nose section. Twin 50 caliber Brownings in a powered mount beneath the Bombardier station. No more handheld guns. No more frantically swinging a single barrel to track fighters closing at 500 mph combined speed.
Lieutenant Robert Johnson, Bombadier with the 91st Bomb Group, trained on the new turret installation for 3 days. The Bendic system used a computing site similar to the top and ball turrets. Lead calculation automatic tracking. The gunner aimed through a reflector site mounted at his station. Electric motors traversed the turret smoothly through 180° of horizontal arc.
Elevation from -40 to positive 30°. Johnson fired test rounds at a ground target range. Accuracy was exceptional. He could engage targets at 1,000 yard and maintain fire through 800 yards of closure. Between September 9th and October 1st, the 8th Air Force received 47 B7Gs, not enough to replace entire groups.
The aircraft were distributed across multiple units, mixed formations. Some squadrons flew combinations of B17F and B7G on the same missions, but every bombader who transitioned to the G model reported the same assessment. The Chin turret changed everything about forward defense. On October 4th, 1943, the 91st bomb group launched 21 B17s against Frankfurt. Six were G models.
German fighters attacked the formation over the Rine. Measures 109s approached from 11:00 high. Standard head-on pass. The six B17Gs engaged with chin turrets at 900 yardds. All six German fighters broke off before reaching firing position. None pressed the attack through the concentrated fire. The remaining 15 B17Fs in the formation equipped with handheld nose guns drew all subsequent head-on attacks.
Two were shot down, both F models. Luftwafa fighter pilots noticed the change immediately. The new fortresses with the nose turret were dangerous to attack from the front. Word spread through German fighter units along the Western Front. Avoid head-on passes against B7s with the chin installation. Attack from below, attack from the rear, attack from the beam, anywhere except straight ahead.
By mid-occtober, 8th Air Force intelligence officers documented the tactical shift. Head-on attacks decreased from 40% of total fighter engagements to 18%. German pilots were adapting, but the adaptation meant longer approach times, more exposure to defensive fire from other positions, lower success rates overall. The Chin turret was forcing the Luftwaffa to use less effective tactics.
Production accelerated. Boeing Seattle plant delivered 93 B7Gs in October. Douglas at Long Beach built 78. Vega and Burbank produced 41. 212 flying fortresses with factoryinstalled chin turrets entered service in one month. November production exceeded 300 aircraft. December pushed toward 400. The assembly lines were hitting peak efficiency.
At RAF Molsworth, the 3003rd bomb group transitioned entirely to B7Gs by November 15th. First complete group conversion. Group commander Colonel Kermit Stevens flew a familiarization mission on November 18th. Target Oslo light opposition. His bombardier engaged two fuckwolves during the withdrawal. Both fighters turned away after taking fire from the Chin turret.
Stevens filed a mission report stating the Bendix installation was the most significant defensive improvement to the Flying Fortress since the ball turret. By December 1st, 1943, the 8th Air Force operated 341 B17Gs in England. still a minority of the total flying fortress force. Most groups flew mixed formations through the winter, but the trend was clear.
Every new aircraft arriving from the United States carried the Chin turret. Every combat loss replaced with a G model. Within 6 months, the eighth would be an all G force. At Douglas Aircraft in Tulsa, workers stripped the extra turrets and armor from 11 YB40 gunships returned from England. The aircraft were being converted to TB40 training platforms, statesside duty, no combat.
But before the modifications were removed, one engineer photographed the Bendix Chin turret installation. That turret design tested for 14 missions over France and Germany was now rolling off three production lines at a combined rate of 50 aircraft per day. 8,680 B7Gs on order. everyone carrying the modification that started as an experiment on a failed gunship.
The experiment that was saving lives over Europe every single day. On January 11th, 1944, 663 heavy bombers attacked aircraft factories in central Germany. The largest single raid by 8th Air Force to date. 421 of those bombers were B7 flying fortresses. 218 carried the Bendix Chin turret, more than half the force.
German fighters concentrated on the formations approaching Brunswick. Measurement and Faulwolf units launched more than 300 interceptors. The attack patterns were different from missions 6 months earlier. Luftwaffa pilots avoided head-on passes against formations with high concentrations of B7Gs. Instead, they attacked from the beam and rear quarters.
Longer approach times, more exposure to crossfire from multiple gun positions. American losses were still significant. 60 bombers failed to return, but statistical analysis showed a clear trend. B7Gs equipped with chin turrets had a 12% lower loss rate than B7Fs on the same missions. Lieutenant Colonel Burn Lelay, 8th Air Force Intelligence Officer, compiled data from four months of combat operations.
Between September 1943 and January 1944, B17Gs flew 9,273 sorties, loss rate 3.8%. B17Fs over the same period flew 14,611 sorties, loss rate 4.9%. The difference was statistically significant. 1.1% lower losses translated to approximately 160 aircraft and 1,600 crewmen surviving missions they would have lost 6 months earlier.
The Chin turret was not the only factor. P-51 Mustang fighters began escorting bombers to Berlin in March 1944. Longrange fighter cover reduced losses across all bomber types. But even accounting for escort fighters, B7Gs maintained lower loss rates than earlier models. The forward defense provided by the Bendix turret continued to disrupt German attack tactics.
Production peaked in March 1944. Boeing delivered 167 B17Gs. Douglas built 149. Vega produced 112 428 flying fortresses in one month. Every aircraft equipped with 1350 caliber machine guns, including the Chin turret. Assembly line workers in Seattle, Long Beach, and Burbank were building one B17G every 93 minutes around the clock.
By April 1st, the 8th Air Force operated exclusively B17G flying fortresses. The last B7F combat mission flew on March 28th. Every operational group in England now carried the Chin turret modification that began as an experiment on 12 overweight gunships. The transition from F to G model took 7 months, faster than any previous variant changeover in Army Air Force’s history.
Between April and June 1944, 8th Air Force bombed targets in France, Belgium, and Germany in preparation for the Normandy invasion. Transportation networks, coastal defenses, communication centers. The bomber offensive reached maximum intensity. B7Gs flew more than 40,000 sorties during those three months. Loss rate dropped to 2.3%, lowest of the war.
Fighter escort was part of the reason, but bombaders credited the Chin turret with preventing the kind of devastating head-on attacks that had characterized missions in early 1943. On D-Day, June 6th, 1944, 1,361 heavy bombers supported the invasion. 815 were B17 flying fortresses, all G models, all equipped with Bendix Chin turrets.
The bombers hit coastal batteries and transportation choke points inland from the beaches. German fighter opposition was minimal. The Luftwaffa had been ground down by months of attrition, but when fighters did appear, American bombarders engaged with chin turrets at extended range. The forward defense that had failed so spectacularly on the YB40 was now standard equipment protecting every flying fortress over Europe.
At Douglas Aircraft in Tulsa, the last YB40 trainer was scrapped in May 1944. The experimental gunship program that lasted 14 combat missions had been forgotten by everyone except the engineers who designed the Chin turret. But that turret was flying on 3,400 B7Gs operating from English bases. With 5,280 more aircraft scheduled for delivery before wars end, the modification that saved the most American bomber crews in World War II came from the most expensive failure the Army Air Force has ever tested in combat. 12 aircraft, 14
missions, four months of operations, one component worth keeping. That component was protecting 8,680 flying fortresses by the time Germany surrendered. On August 24th, 1944, Lieutenant Harold Fiser piloted B17G, tail number 4297,412 over Merberg, Germany. Third mission to the synthetic oil refineries, heaviest defended target in the Reich.
Flack damaged his number three engine over the initial point. Fiser maintained formation position. His bombardier, Second Lieutenant William Crane, tracked targets through the Chin turret site while preparing for the bomb run. Two Measure Smmith 109’s attacked from 12:00 high. Closure rate 520 mph. Crane engaged at 1,000 yd.
The Bendix turret traversed smoothly. First burst caught the lead measurement in the wing route. The fighter rolled inverted and dove. Second Measure pressed the attack. Crane fired continuously through 800 yards. Tracers converged on the German fighter’s nose section. The Messmmet broke left, trailing smoke. Both attacks disrupted before either fighter reached effective firing range.
Fischer’s B7G completed the bomb run and returned to England on three engines. Crane’s afteraction report credited the chin turret with preventing a successful head-on attack that would have killed him and the pilot. Similar reports flooded into 8th Air Force headquarters throughout late 1944.
The Chin turret was doing exactly what Colonel Reed had predicted in August 1943, disrupting head-on attacks before German fighters could inflict critical damage. By October 1944, the Army Air Forces had accepted delivery of 6,143 B7Gs from all three production plants. Boeing accounted for 3,049 aircraft. Douglas built 2395.
Vega produced 699. The assembly lines continued operating at maximum capacity. Monthly deliveries averaged 380 aircraft through the fall. Statistical analysis from January through October 1944 showed the cumulative impact. B7Gs flew 137,412 combat sorties over Europe. Total losses 3,291 aircraft. Loss rate 2.4%.
Compared to B7F losses during the same months in 1943, 4.8%. The difference represented approximately 3,300 bombers that survived missions. 33,000 crewmen who came home instead of dying over Germany. Not all those survivors owed their lives to the Chin turret. Fighter escort improved dramatically in 1944.
German fighter strength declined as the Lustwafa lost experienced pilots, but combat reports consistently identified the chin turret as a critical factor in defeating head-on attacks. The tactic that had been devastating in early 1943 was no longer effective by late 1944. German fighters had to use less advantageous attack angles, longer approach times, more exposure to defensive fire from multiple positions.
On December 24th, 1944, the 8th Air Force launched the largest single-day mission of the war. 2,34 heavy bombers attacked transportation targets across Germany. 1,487 were B17 flying fortresses. Every single aircraft carried the Bendix Chin turret. German fighter opposition was moderate. Luftwafa units were concentrated defending against Soviet advances in the east.
But when fighters did engage, American bombarders used the Chin turret to disrupt attacks at extended range. Zero successful head-on passes recorded that day against formations equipped with the modification. Production continued through the winter. Boeing delivered its final B7G on April 13th, 1945. Tail number 4483,872. Douglas completed its last Flying Fortress on April 20th.
Vegas final aircraft rolled off the line on April 29th. Total B7G production, 8,680 aircraft. Everyone equipped with the Chin turret modification that began on 12 experimental gunships in May 1943. The YB40 program cost the Army Air Forces approximately $8 million, 12 aircraft modified, 14 combat missions, five enemy fighters destroyed, one YB40 lost.
The program was terminated after 4 months, complete tactical failure. But the Bendix Chin turret tested on those 12 gunships became standard equipment on 8,680 production bombers that flew 473,000 combat sorties before Germany surrendered. Engineers at Wrightfield calculated the return on investment. 8 million spent on the YB40 program. One component retained that component installed on aircraft worth $600 million.
Those aircraft protected by improved forward defense that saved an estimated 3,000 bombers and 30,000 crewmen from successful head-on attacks. The most expensive failure in Army Air Force’s history had produced the most cost-effective modification of the entire war. The last combat mission flown by B7 Flying fortresses in Europe launched on April 25th, 1945.
Target Pilson, Czechoslovakia. Scod Armaments Works. 357 B7Gs participated. Light opposition. German fighter strength had collapsed. The Lufafa was grounded by fuel shortages and lack of trained pilots. American bombaders manned chin turrets out of habit more than necessity. No head-on attacks that day. The war was ending.
Germany surrendered on May 8th, 1945. By that date, 8,680 B7Gs had been delivered to the Army Air Forces. Approximately 4,000 remained operational in Europe. The rest were scattered across training bases in the United States, Pacific theater units, or lost in combat. Every surviving aircraft carried the Bendix Chin turret modification that started as an experiment on 12 overweight gunships in May 1943.
Post-war analysis by Army Air Force’s statistical control division calculated the Chin turret’s impact on bomber survival rates. Between September 1943 and May 1945, B17Gs equipped with the modification flew 473,216 combat sorties over Europe. Head-on fighter attacks accounted for 4.2% 2% of total losses.
In 1942 and early 1943, before the Chin turret was introduced, head-on attacks had accounted for 38.7% of B7 losses. The reduction represented approximately 4,700 aircraft that survived missions specifically because the Bendix turret disrupted frontal attacks. 4,700 bombers, 47,000 crewmen, all owing their survival in part to a modification tested on a failed gunship program that lasted 14 missions.
Captain Robert Shannon, the pilot who flew six YB40 missions from Alenbury, completed his combat tour in October 1943. He returned to the United States and trained B7 crews at McDill Field in Florida. Shannon never saw a production B17G until March 1944 when the first G models arrived at McDill for crew transition training.
He recognized the chin turret immediately. Same Bendix installation he had flown over sent Nazisair and Keel. Same mount that had worked when everything else on the YB40 failed. Technical Sergeant James Harmon, Shannon’s Bombader and Chin turret gunner, flew 28 combat missions. He was killed on January 29th, 1944 when his B17F was shot down over Frankfurt head-on attack.
The aircraft he was flying that day did not have a chin turret. Harmon died 4 months before his old squadron converted to B17Gs. Colonel William Reed retired from the Army Air Forces in 1946. He never received recognition for recommending the Chin turret modification. The official history of the YB40 program written in 1947 mentioned Reed’s report only in passing.
His assessment that the Chin turret represented the sole valuable component of the gunship concept was buried in appendix documents. But Reed’s statistical analysis proved accurate. The 20% firepower increase from YB40 modifications translated to only 10% effectiveness. Most of that effectiveness came from the Chin turret. At the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio, one B17G Flying Fortress sits on display.
Tail number 4483,514. The aircraft flew 37 combat missions from England between November 1944 and April 1945. Zero losses to head-on attacks. The Bendix Chin turret beneath the Bombader station remains in working condition. Museum curators identify it as standard equipment on all Godel flying fortresses.
They do not mention the YB40 program. Most visitors have never heard of the experimental gunship that tested the modification. The 12 YB40 aircraft that flew 14 combat missions in summer 1943 disappeared into history. One was shot down over Germany. The rest returned to the United States and were scrapped by late 1944. No YB40 survived the war, but the Chin turret they tested protected 8,680 production bombers through the end of hostilities.
Those bombers flew nearly half a million combat sorties. 4,700 aircraft survived specifically because of improved forward defense. The arithmetic was undeniable. 12 experimental gunships, 4 months of testing, one modification retained. That modification saved more American lives than any other defensive improvement to the Flying Fortress during World War II.
The program was a failure. The modification was a triumph, and nobody remembers the difference. In May 1943, the United States Army air forces faced a crisis. German fighters were destroying flying fortresses faster than factories could replace them. Head-on attacks killed pilots and bombaders before defensive gunners could engage.
Losses exceeded 30% on deep penetration missions. The daylight bombing campaign was failing. Someone at rightfield proposed an experiment. Convert flying fortresses into heavily armed escorts. Add guns, add turrets, add armor, protect the bombers with concentrated defensive firepower. The concept made sense on paper.
In combat, it was a disaster. The YB40 was too heavy, too slow, too vulnerable. After 14 missions, the program was cancelled. $8 million wasted, 12 aircraft scrapped. Complete failure. except for one component. The Bendix chin turret mounted beneath the bombader station worked exactly as designed.
It engaged attacking fighters at extended range. It disrupted head-on passes before German pilots could inflict critical damage. It was the only modification worth keeping. Boeing, Douglas, and Vega installed that turret on 8,680 production B17Gs. Those aircraft flew 473,000 combat sordies over Europe between September 1943 and May 1945. The Chin turret reduced successful head-on attacks from 38% of losses to 4%. 4,700 bombers survived.
47,000 crewmen came home. All because someone at 8th Air Force headquarters recognized that a failed experiment had produced one brilliant solution. The men who designed the YB40 received no recognition. The pilots who tested it in combat were forgotten. The engineers who developed the Bendix turret never became famous.
But their work saved more American lives than almost any other defensive modification in World War II. A modification that began as part of the Army Air Force’s most expensive failure became its most coste effective success. This is why we tell these stories. Not because every innovation succeeds, not because every experiment works, but because sometimes the greatest achievements come from recognizing what works inside something that fails.
The YB40 program was a disaster. The Chin turret was a triumph. Understanding the difference saved 47,000 lives. Captain Robert Shannon flew six YB40 missions and survived the war. He never flew a B7G in combat, but he tested the modification that protected every flying fortress that came after him. Technical Sergeant James Harmon, his bombardier, was killed in January 1944, flying a B17F without a Chin turret, 4 months before his squadron converted to G models.
Harmon died because the modification he helped test had not reached his aircraft in time. Colonel William Reed wrote the report that saved the Chin turret from cancellation. Nobody remembers his name. The official histories mention him once, but his recommendation protected 8,000 680 bombers and changed the air war over Europe.
These men deserve to be remembered, not because they succeeded, but because they failed forward. They tested something that didn’t work and found the one piece that did. That piece saved 47,000 American airmen from the same fate that claimed hundreds of bomber crews in early 1943. We dug through declassified mission reports to bring you this story.
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Stories about American airmen who risked everything on an experiment that failed and left behind the one piece that mattered. Drop a comment and tell us where you are right now. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, somewhere we have never heard from before. We get messages from six continents. Every single one reminds us why we do this.
You are not just watching. You are the reason these men finally get their names spoken out loud. If someone in your family flew bombers over Europe, tell us about them. We read every comment. Thank you for staying until the end. Captain Shannon, Sergeant Harmon, and Colonel Reed spent 80 years buried in filing cabinets. Not anymore.
They flew a failure. They found a breakthrough. And now you
