November 1944, France. The Lraine campaign. The Third Army was grinding through some of the worst fighting of the Western Front. Colonel James Harwick had commanded the 318th Infantry Regiment for 11 months. He’d led them through North Africa, through Sicily, through the Hedros of Normandy. His men trusted him. His officers trusted him.
Patton trusted him. On the morning of November 8th, the 308th was ordered to take a German-h held ridgeel line outside the town of Saint of Old. The Germans had dug in hard. Artillery, machine gun nests, interlocking fields of fire designed to stop exactly this kind of assault. The attack began at dawn.
Within the first 30 minutes, three company commanders were down. The assault was stalling. German fire was coming from positions the pre-attack reconnaissance hadn’t identified. Men were pinned in the open, unable to advance, unable to retreat. In the middle of this, something happened that no one in the regiment had ever seen before.
Colonel Harwick left not to coordinate with supporting units, not to establish a new command post. He got in his vehicle and drove back toward the rear. His radio went silent. His men, pinned on that ridge line, were left without a commander in the middle of an active firefight. His executive officer took command, did what he could.
The regiment held barely, but the assault objective was lost. The report reached Patton by afternoon. He read it, read it again. Then he asked for Harwick to be brought to him. Before we get into what Patton said, if you want more untold stories from World War II, hit that subscribe button. Harwick arrived at Patton’s command post that evening.
He was still in his field uniform, still carrying the dust and mud of the morning on his boots and his jacket. He came to attention in front of Patton’s desk. Patton looked at him for a long moment without speaking. The room was small. A lamp on the desk, maps on the walls, the silence, the kind that has physical weight when you’re the one standing in it.
Then Patton said, “Tell me what happened.” Harwick gave his account the way a professional officer gives an account, organized, sequential, without visible emotion. The German fire had been heavier than the pre-attack reconnaissance indicated. The initial command post position had come under direct observation and was taking accurate fire.
He had made the decision to relocate to a more secure position to maintain effective command and control of the regiment. He had intended to reestablish radio contact once he reached a position that wasn’t under active fire. It was a coherent account. There was logic in it under different circumstances in a different battle. It might even have been the right decision.
Patton listened to every word without expression. When Harwick finished, Patton let the silence sit for a moment before he spoke. How long were you out of communication? Harwick hesitated for a fraction of a second. Approximately two hours, sir. Two hours. Yes, sir. While your men were pinned on a ridgeel line under direct fire without a regimental commander.
The situation required. I didn’t ask about the situation. I asked about the time. Another silence. Longer this time. Colonel, I’ve known you for 11 months. I’ve watched you lead men through North Africa, through Sicily, through Normandy. I know what you’ve done. I know what you’re capable of. So, I want you to understand that what I’m about to say comes from that knowledge, not from anger, not from rage, from knowing who you are and what you did this morning.
Harwick stood very still. What you did this morning is the worst thing an infantry officer can do. Not because you were afraid. Fear is normal. Every man on that ridge line was afraid. I’ve been afraid. The difference is they stayed. They stayed because they trusted that their commander was with them, that he would stay, that whatever happened to them was happening to him, too.
And you left. Patton stood up from behind his desk. When a commander leaves his men under fire, he doesn’t just lose a battle. He destroys something that cannot be rebuilt quickly and sometimes cannot be rebuilt at all. He destroys the understanding that makes men willing to go forward the next time an order is given.
Because the next time those men are told to advance into fire, some part of them is going to remember that their colonel drove away when it got hard. And that memory costs lives in ways that don’t show up in any report. He moved around the desk and stood directly in front of Harwick. You have two choices. You can request relief. I’ll grant it.
You’ll go home and your career ends here. That will be honest at least. Or you can go back to that regiment, stand in front of those men, and find a way to earn back what you lost this morning. He paused. I won’t pretend the second choice is easy. I won’t pretend it’s even possible, but it’s the choice I’m offering you.
Harwick was quiet for a long moment. What would you do, sir? Patton looked at him steadily. I’d go back, but I’m not the one who has to stand in front of those men’s faces. He returned to his desk. I’m giving you 48 hours. Tell me your decision. Harwick chose to go back. He made his decision within the hour. Sent word immediately to Patton’s aid that same evening.
No explanation, no elaboration, no conditions, just the decision. He was going back to the regiment. It was the harder choice. Not because of the physical danger, though the danger was real and the next assault was going to be bloody. It was harder because of the men, because he was going to have to stand in front of soldiers who had been pinned on a ridge line while their colonel drove away and somehow find a way to be their commander again.
He returned to the 318th the following morning. His executive officer, Major David Crane, met him at the forward command post, said nothing. Didn’t need to. The expression said enough. The other officer said nothing either. The sergeants who moved through the area said nothing. They knew. Of course they knew.
In a regiment, information moves faster than any official communication. Every man in the 318th had heard what happened by the previous evening. Harwick didn’t make a speech. Didn’t call the regiment together for an address. He called his company commanders to the command post, what remained of them after the previous day’s losses, and went over the tactical situation on the ridge line, what the German positions looked like, what had failed in the first assault, and why, what needed to be different in the second attempt. He didn’t talk about
himself. Then he did something that surprised everyone who watched it happen. He went forward to the frontline positions and spent 3 hours moving through the defensive positions the regiment had established after the previous day’s assault, not meeting with officers, going to where the men were in the foxholes and the shell craters and the hastily dug positions in the French mud, squad by squad, sitting with them, listening to what they had seen and experienced during the assault, what the German fire had been like from their
position on the ground, what they needed. He didn’t explain himself. He didn’t apologize. at least not in words. He just listened. For three hours, in the cold and the mud of a November afternoon in France, the colonel went to his men and listened. One sergeant, a man named Carl Bryley from Arkansas, who had been with the regiment since the North Africa campaign and who had seen everything the campaign had to offer, said afterward that Harwick had looked like a different man when he came back from those three hours in the forward
positions, not softer, older, like something had settled onto him that he was going to carry for the rest of his life. The 318th took the Saint of Old Ridgeline 6 days later. Harwick led the assault in the first wave, not from a command post, not from a position to the rear where he could observe and direct.
He went forward with the lead elements, close enough to the fighting that he could see the German positions and direct fire onto them personally. When a machine gun imp placement held up the advance on the left flank, he moved to where he could see it and directed the flanking element himself, standing in the open on a hillside in France, directing men under fire, doing exactly what he had failed to do 6 days earlier.
The ridgeel line fell in 4 hours. The regiment’s casualties were lower than the first attempt. Despite the fact that the Germans had reinforced their positions, and the resistance was stiffer than before, the men fought differently, not because Harwick had given an inspiring speech, because he had been there the entire time, and they had seen him be there.
Patton received the afteraction report that evening, read it once carefully. He was not given to extensive private reflection on paper, but he wrote a brief entry in his diary that night. Harwick redeemed himself today. I don’t know exactly what it cost him to go back, but it cost him something real. Those are usually the ones who stay paid.
Harwick commanded the 318th Infantry Regiment through the very end of the war. through the brutal SAR campaign, through the crossing of the Rine in the spring, through the final advance deep into Germany in the last weeks before German surrender. He never left his men again. Not when the situation became difficult, not when German artillery was finding his command post and the sensible thing would have been to move.
Not when the fighting was going badly and the instinct was to pull back and regroup. He stayed forward, not recklessly. Not in a way that got him killed and left his regiment without a commander when they needed one most, but present, always present, consistently visible and there in a way that the men could see and feel and know without being told.
It was Major David Crane who was asked about it years later in the early 1970s by a military historian who was writing a full regimental history of the 318th Infantry. The historian asked the question carefully. He’d read the operational records. He knew what had happened in November 1944. He asked Crane after the events of November 8th, did the men of the 318th ever fully trust Harwick again? Crane thought about the question for a long time before answering.
They trusted him differently, he said finally. Before November, they trusted him the way you trust someone who hasn’t let you down yet. You believe in them because you have no reason not to. After November, they trusted him the way you trust someone who let you down. Understood what it meant and came back anyway.
He paused, looking at something the historian couldn’t see. In a lot of ways, the second kind is harder to earn and more durable when you have it. A man who’s never failed hasn’t been tested. A man who failed and came back has been tested, and you know what he’s made of. The historian asked whether Harwick ever spoke about November 8th. Not once.
Not to me, not to the men, not to anyone he served with. He never explained it, never justified it, never brought it up. He just went back and did the job differently from that day forward. Crane paused again. That was his answer, not words, just showing up every single day and being there when it mattered. Herwick returned home after the war and lived quietly for the rest of his long life.
He gave no interviews about his service. He wrote no memoirs. He declined requests from military historians who tracked him down in the 1950s and 1960s. The operational records existed in the military archives. The afteraction reports existed. Patton’s diary entry existed. Harwick never contradicted any of it and never elaborated on any of it.
He died in 1981. At his funeral, a veteran of the 308th named Robert Fenwick gave the eulogy. He was in his mid60s by then, gay-haired and walking with a cane from an old wound, but he had served in the regiment from the North Africa campaign all the way through the end of the war. He talked about the campaigns across North Africa and Sicily and France and Germany, about the battles and what they cost, about the men they had lost and the places they had fought through together across more than 2 years of war. He talked about what it had meant
to be part of that regiment through all of it, from beginning to end. Near the end of the eulogy, he paused and mentioned November 8th. Just the fact of it briefly without any detail or explanation. And then he said, “A lot of men would have gone home after what happened on November 8th. He came back. That’s what I remember. He came back.
” What do you think? Was Patton right to give Harwick a second chance and let him earn it back or should he have relieved him immediately on the spot? Let us know in the comments below. And if you want more untold stories from World War II, make sure you subscribe.
“What Patton Said When His Own Colonel Abandoned His Men Under Fire”
November 1944, France. The Lraine campaign. The Third Army was grinding through some of the worst fighting of the Western Front. Colonel James Harwick had commanded the 318th Infantry Regiment for 11 months. He’d led them through North Africa, through Sicily, through the Hedros of Normandy. His men trusted him. His officers trusted him.
Patton trusted him. On the morning of November 8th, the 308th was ordered to take a German-h held ridgeel line outside the town of Saint of Old. The Germans had dug in hard. Artillery, machine gun nests, interlocking fields of fire designed to stop exactly this kind of assault. The attack began at dawn.
Within the first 30 minutes, three company commanders were down. The assault was stalling. German fire was coming from positions the pre-attack reconnaissance hadn’t identified. Men were pinned in the open, unable to advance, unable to retreat. In the middle of this, something happened that no one in the regiment had ever seen before.
Colonel Harwick left not to coordinate with supporting units, not to establish a new command post. He got in his vehicle and drove back toward the rear. His radio went silent. His men, pinned on that ridge line, were left without a commander in the middle of an active firefight. His executive officer took command, did what he could.
The regiment held barely, but the assault objective was lost. The report reached Patton by afternoon. He read it, read it again. Then he asked for Harwick to be brought to him. Before we get into what Patton said, if you want more untold stories from World War II, hit that subscribe button. Harwick arrived at Patton’s command post that evening.
He was still in his field uniform, still carrying the dust and mud of the morning on his boots and his jacket. He came to attention in front of Patton’s desk. Patton looked at him for a long moment without speaking. The room was small. A lamp on the desk, maps on the walls, the silence, the kind that has physical weight when you’re the one standing in it.
Then Patton said, “Tell me what happened.” Harwick gave his account the way a professional officer gives an account, organized, sequential, without visible emotion. The German fire had been heavier than the pre-attack reconnaissance indicated. The initial command post position had come under direct observation and was taking accurate fire.
He had made the decision to relocate to a more secure position to maintain effective command and control of the regiment. He had intended to reestablish radio contact once he reached a position that wasn’t under active fire. It was a coherent account. There was logic in it under different circumstances in a different battle. It might even have been the right decision.
Patton listened to every word without expression. When Harwick finished, Patton let the silence sit for a moment before he spoke. How long were you out of communication? Harwick hesitated for a fraction of a second. Approximately two hours, sir. Two hours. Yes, sir. While your men were pinned on a ridgeel line under direct fire without a regimental commander.
The situation required. I didn’t ask about the situation. I asked about the time. Another silence. Longer this time. Colonel, I’ve known you for 11 months. I’ve watched you lead men through North Africa, through Sicily, through Normandy. I know what you’ve done. I know what you’re capable of. So, I want you to understand that what I’m about to say comes from that knowledge, not from anger, not from rage, from knowing who you are and what you did this morning.
Harwick stood very still. What you did this morning is the worst thing an infantry officer can do. Not because you were afraid. Fear is normal. Every man on that ridge line was afraid. I’ve been afraid. The difference is they stayed. They stayed because they trusted that their commander was with them, that he would stay, that whatever happened to them was happening to him, too.
And you left. Patton stood up from behind his desk. When a commander leaves his men under fire, he doesn’t just lose a battle. He destroys something that cannot be rebuilt quickly and sometimes cannot be rebuilt at all. He destroys the understanding that makes men willing to go forward the next time an order is given.
Because the next time those men are told to advance into fire, some part of them is going to remember that their colonel drove away when it got hard. And that memory costs lives in ways that don’t show up in any report. He moved around the desk and stood directly in front of Harwick. You have two choices. You can request relief. I’ll grant it.
You’ll go home and your career ends here. That will be honest at least. Or you can go back to that regiment, stand in front of those men, and find a way to earn back what you lost this morning. He paused. I won’t pretend the second choice is easy. I won’t pretend it’s even possible, but it’s the choice I’m offering you.
Harwick was quiet for a long moment. What would you do, sir? Patton looked at him steadily. I’d go back, but I’m not the one who has to stand in front of those men’s faces. He returned to his desk. I’m giving you 48 hours. Tell me your decision. Harwick chose to go back. He made his decision within the hour. Sent word immediately to Patton’s aid that same evening.
No explanation, no elaboration, no conditions, just the decision. He was going back to the regiment. It was the harder choice. Not because of the physical danger, though the danger was real and the next assault was going to be bloody. It was harder because of the men, because he was going to have to stand in front of soldiers who had been pinned on a ridge line while their colonel drove away and somehow find a way to be their commander again.
He returned to the 318th the following morning. His executive officer, Major David Crane, met him at the forward command post, said nothing. Didn’t need to. The expression said enough. The other officer said nothing either. The sergeants who moved through the area said nothing. They knew. Of course they knew.
In a regiment, information moves faster than any official communication. Every man in the 318th had heard what happened by the previous evening. Harwick didn’t make a speech. Didn’t call the regiment together for an address. He called his company commanders to the command post, what remained of them after the previous day’s losses, and went over the tactical situation on the ridge line, what the German positions looked like, what had failed in the first assault, and why, what needed to be different in the second attempt. He didn’t talk about
himself. Then he did something that surprised everyone who watched it happen. He went forward to the frontline positions and spent 3 hours moving through the defensive positions the regiment had established after the previous day’s assault, not meeting with officers, going to where the men were in the foxholes and the shell craters and the hastily dug positions in the French mud, squad by squad, sitting with them, listening to what they had seen and experienced during the assault, what the German fire had been like from their
position on the ground, what they needed. He didn’t explain himself. He didn’t apologize. at least not in words. He just listened. For three hours, in the cold and the mud of a November afternoon in France, the colonel went to his men and listened. One sergeant, a man named Carl Bryley from Arkansas, who had been with the regiment since the North Africa campaign and who had seen everything the campaign had to offer, said afterward that Harwick had looked like a different man when he came back from those three hours in the forward
positions, not softer, older, like something had settled onto him that he was going to carry for the rest of his life. The 318th took the Saint of Old Ridgeline 6 days later. Harwick led the assault in the first wave, not from a command post, not from a position to the rear where he could observe and direct.
He went forward with the lead elements, close enough to the fighting that he could see the German positions and direct fire onto them personally. When a machine gun imp placement held up the advance on the left flank, he moved to where he could see it and directed the flanking element himself, standing in the open on a hillside in France, directing men under fire, doing exactly what he had failed to do 6 days earlier.
The ridgeel line fell in 4 hours. The regiment’s casualties were lower than the first attempt. Despite the fact that the Germans had reinforced their positions, and the resistance was stiffer than before, the men fought differently, not because Harwick had given an inspiring speech, because he had been there the entire time, and they had seen him be there.
Patton received the afteraction report that evening, read it once carefully. He was not given to extensive private reflection on paper, but he wrote a brief entry in his diary that night. Harwick redeemed himself today. I don’t know exactly what it cost him to go back, but it cost him something real. Those are usually the ones who stay paid.
Harwick commanded the 318th Infantry Regiment through the very end of the war. through the brutal SAR campaign, through the crossing of the Rine in the spring, through the final advance deep into Germany in the last weeks before German surrender. He never left his men again. Not when the situation became difficult, not when German artillery was finding his command post and the sensible thing would have been to move.
Not when the fighting was going badly and the instinct was to pull back and regroup. He stayed forward, not recklessly. Not in a way that got him killed and left his regiment without a commander when they needed one most, but present, always present, consistently visible and there in a way that the men could see and feel and know without being told.
It was Major David Crane who was asked about it years later in the early 1970s by a military historian who was writing a full regimental history of the 318th Infantry. The historian asked the question carefully. He’d read the operational records. He knew what had happened in November 1944. He asked Crane after the events of November 8th, did the men of the 318th ever fully trust Harwick again? Crane thought about the question for a long time before answering.
They trusted him differently, he said finally. Before November, they trusted him the way you trust someone who hasn’t let you down yet. You believe in them because you have no reason not to. After November, they trusted him the way you trust someone who let you down. Understood what it meant and came back anyway.
He paused, looking at something the historian couldn’t see. In a lot of ways, the second kind is harder to earn and more durable when you have it. A man who’s never failed hasn’t been tested. A man who failed and came back has been tested, and you know what he’s made of. The historian asked whether Harwick ever spoke about November 8th. Not once.
Not to me, not to the men, not to anyone he served with. He never explained it, never justified it, never brought it up. He just went back and did the job differently from that day forward. Crane paused again. That was his answer, not words, just showing up every single day and being there when it mattered. Herwick returned home after the war and lived quietly for the rest of his long life.
He gave no interviews about his service. He wrote no memoirs. He declined requests from military historians who tracked him down in the 1950s and 1960s. The operational records existed in the military archives. The afteraction reports existed. Patton’s diary entry existed. Harwick never contradicted any of it and never elaborated on any of it.
He died in 1981. At his funeral, a veteran of the 308th named Robert Fenwick gave the eulogy. He was in his mid60s by then, gay-haired and walking with a cane from an old wound, but he had served in the regiment from the North Africa campaign all the way through the end of the war. He talked about the campaigns across North Africa and Sicily and France and Germany, about the battles and what they cost, about the men they had lost and the places they had fought through together across more than 2 years of war. He talked about what it had meant
to be part of that regiment through all of it, from beginning to end. Near the end of the eulogy, he paused and mentioned November 8th. Just the fact of it briefly without any detail or explanation. And then he said, “A lot of men would have gone home after what happened on November 8th. He came back. That’s what I remember. He came back.
” What do you think? Was Patton right to give Harwick a second chance and let him earn it back or should he have relieved him immediately on the spot? Let us know in the comments below. And if you want more untold stories from World War II, make sure you subscribe.
